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Brent D. Bowen
Dr. Brent Bowen is Director and Professor, Aviation Institute,
Department of Public Administration, University of Nebraska at Omaha,
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from Oklahoma State University and a Master of Business Administration
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Administration certifications include Airline Transport Pilot, Certified
Flight Instructor (Gold Seal), Advanced Instrument Ground Instructor,
Aviation Safety Counselor, and Aerospace Education Counselor. Dr.
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Kabashkin received his Doctor Degree in Aviation from Moscow Civil
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SORENSON BEST PAPER AWARD
The Journal of Air Transportation World Wide is proud to present the
Sorenson Best Paper Award, named in honor of Dr. Frank E. Sorenson. This
award gives recognition to the author(s) with the best literary and scholarly
contributions to the field of air transportation. The Editor, on the basis of
reviewer rankings during the review process, grants the Sorenson Award.
The manuscript with the highest overall score is awarded the Sorenson Best
Paper Award. This is considered a high recognition in the aviation
community.
Dr. Frank E. Sorenson was a pioneer in the field of aviation education
since its early beginnings in the 1940s. A renowned educator and prolific
writer, Sorenson contributed not only education texts to the field, but also
served as a consultant and innovator throughout the expanding realm of
aviation education and research.
Dr. Sorenson’s aviation impact and potential were recognized early on
by the National Aeronautics Association when he received the Frank G.
Brewer Trophy in 1946 for the most outstanding contribution to the
development of youth in the field of education and training. In 1958, the
University Aviation Association honored him with the William A.
Wheatley Award in recognition of outstanding contributions to aviation
education. These were the first of many awards and citations he would earn
on a local and national level as he continued his active involvement in the
field of aerospace education up until his death in 1977.
Through his involvement with the University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Teachers College, Dr. Sorenson generated some of the earliest teaching
materials for aviation education and textbooks for military aviators during
World War II. Throughout the course of his career, he contributed over forty
articles and publications related to the field of aviation education. His
efforts guided the way for extensive aerospace research and scholarship
from the grassroots to the global level through his participation in Civil
Aeronautics Association, the World Congress on Air Age Education, and
UNESCO. He has served as chairman of the Air Force Associations
Aerospace Council, the Aerospace Education Forum at the First World
Congress of Flight, the U.S. Air Force Air Training Command, the Men in
Space book series, and NASA’s Aerospace Education Advisory
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Committee. As a result of his visionary involvement and development of
the Link Foundation, the organization has gone on to provide grants now
totaling over a half million dollars a year to support and advance aerospace
education and training in aeronautics.
Dr. Sorenson’s continuous involvement in aviation education and
research laid the groundwork for many of the advancements currently
taking place in the industry. His ceaseless research and educational
outreach demonstrated how one person can make a difference not just today
but well into the future.
Currently, several awards exist that are representative of his achievement
in aerospace education and research. These include the Frank E. Sorenson
Award for Excellence in Aviation Scholarship, representing the highest
scholarly honor in aviation education, presented annually by the University
Aviation Association; the Frank E. Sorenson Pioneers in Nebraska Aviation
Education Award presented annually by the University of Nebraska at
Omaha Aviation Institute, as well as a memorial lecture fund and
scholarship fund.
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MARKETING TO FEMALE BUSINESS
TRAVELLERS
Dr. Fariba Alamdari
Bedford, U.K.
and
Julian Burrell
London, U.K.
ABSTRACT
Business passengers are the most profitable segment of the market for airline industry.
Airlines have put an enormous amount of effort into improving the quality of service offered
to business travellers. However, a fast growing sub-segment of the market, female business
passengers, appears not to be receiving any special attention from airline product planners. In
the U.S. it was predicted that female travellers will represent 50 percent of the business travel
market by the turn of the century (Equality, 1996). Such growth in this segment of the market
raises a few questions. Do airlines view this sub-segment valuable enough to divert special
effort to meet the passenger requirement? Do the requirements of female business travellers
differ from those of male business travellers? Does the airline industry meet the travel needs
of this sub-segment of the market? How can airlines increase their share of such a growing
sub-segment of the market? To address these questions surveys of both airlines and female
business travellers in Europe and the U.S. were carried out. The findings indicate that the
airlines view the growth of this sub-segment as important. However, only a few carriers have
devoted resources to address female business travel needs. Although the needs of the female
business travellers are in many ways similar to those of the male business traveller, there are
differences in certain areas such as concerns over airport security, advice on safety and better
washrooms. Clearly these requirements must be accommodated if airlines wish to
increasingly attract this growing sub-segment of the market.
INTRODUCTION
For the majority of scheduled carriers, revenues earned from business
class passengers represent a significant amount of income and create a
significant proportion of profits earned. Therefore, in order to maintain
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competitive advantage, it is vital that airlines continuously address the
requirements of the business class passenger and update their related
market intelligence.
As can be seen on Table 1, it is only the business class cabin that tends to
generate profit for airlines. However the revenue generated from first and
economy class do not cover the associated costs, as the actual load factor in
both cabins are below the load factor required in order to break-even. This
is not to say that all airlines are facing the same situation but it illustrates
that on average business class cabin is the profitable side of airline
operations.
However, the business class passenger is no longer a one segment issue.
It is the growth and gradual establishment of a specific sub-sector of
business class—the female business flyer that requires special attention.
Traditionally being viewed as an employee working in the less elevated
ranks of corporate life, the female is now starting to break through into
higher managerial positions. This development has led to some sectors,
typically those that have focused on the male business traveller, adjusting to
a tremendous growth in the numbers of female business travellers. The
hotel industry, for instance, can be viewed as one such sector, which has
realised the need to adapt the services and facilities offered, in order to
better accommodate its new customers.
In the U.S. it was predicted that female travellers will represent 50
percent of the business travel market by the turn of the century. In the U.K.
women represent 30 to 40 percent of business travellers. This is a dramatic
increase since 1980 when they accounted for only four percent (Equality,
1996). Travel Weekly (1999) reported that a study by Travel Research
Centre, indicated that the percentage of female business travellers on long
haul routes from France and Germany has increased from six percent in
1989 to 22 percent and 26 percent, respectively, in 1999. Such trends in the
growth of the female business travellers market raises several questions.
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Table 1. Passenger Results by Class of Service, 1997
First Class Business Class Economy Class
Passenger load factor achieved % 40.80 54.30 76.20
Operating expenses per ASK USc 13.87 9.74 05.18
Yield per RPK USc 24.61 21.62 06.63
Load factor to cover expenses % 56.40 43.80 78.20
Note: Available Seat Kilometre (ASK); Revenue Passenger Kilometre (RPK); U.S. currency (USc).
Source: IATA Airline Economic Task Force, 1998
 Do airlines realise the potential of female business travellers market?
 Do airlines offer any specific services targeted at the travel needs of
female passengers?
 What are female business travellers’ needs?
 Are there opportunities for airlines to capture market share by
improving the business travel experience for women?
It is the aim of this paper to address the above questions by carrying out a
survey of both airlines and female business travellers in the U.S. and
Europe. The reason for this specific geographical focus lies primarily in the
fact that these are already acknowledged as having the main growth
markets in the sector (Equality, 1996).
FEMALE BUSINESS TRAVELLERS
The growth in the number of business women could provide a clear
explanation for the growth in female business travellers. It is evident that as
the percentage of women in the labour force continues to increase, it is
more likely that they will reach a level within the company at which
business travel becomes more frequent. Compounding this, is an increase
in the number of females taking up business related courses at the level of
higher education.
Fundamental changes in the industrialised world during the past twenty
years has encouraged more women to enter the labour force. In the 1950s in
the United Kingdom, for instance, women only made up one-third of the
labour force. However, in the 1990s this proportion has risen to around one-
half (Hansard Society Report, 1990).
Goffee and Scase (1985) believe that there are two major phenomena
that account for this dramatic shift. The first has to do with demographic
changes. As women now tend to live longer, marry later and have fewer
children, they are increasingly able to take up work. The second is possibly
more fundamental. This has to do with the restructuring of women’s
psychological expectations, shifting their motivations and self-identities
from one which has previously been marriage-related to one which is far
more work-related. Research in this area has shown that the percentage of
women engaged in professional occupations has leapt from 16 percent in
1991 to 20 percent in 1997 (Webb, 1998). In addition, female membership
of the Institute of Directors has risen by 60 percent since 1994.
In addition to the evidence of the increase in the number of business
women as a whole, further statistics are available to support the growth in
female business travellers activity. As can be seen from Table 2 there has
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been a growth in the number of female business travellers using the London
Airports (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted) between 1983 and 1996.
It appears that a number of airlines have recognised the growth in female
business travellers market and have started a few initiatives. Some
examples are provided below.
In terms of offering safety advice, Delta airlines have designed an
executive women’s travel page on their website. This provides general
advice on safety issues relevant to the female, but is not destination
specific.
Research undertaken by United Airlines indicated that female business
travelers are sometimes mistaken to be leisure flyers and are not treated in
the same manner as male business flyers. Based on their findings, their
flight attendants are trained with the emphasis on the importance of treating
female business flyers with the same degree of respect and value as their
male business passenger counterparts (United Airlines, 1998).
In a study commissioned by Midway, it was found that women tended to
spend three times longer in the bathroom than men. Every aircraft in the
Midway fleet now has a women’s only restroom and a unisex lavatory. The
restroom has a carpeted floor, a full-length mirror, flowers and automated
sanitary toilet seat covers. Japan Airlines (JAL) decided to introduce their
‘Ladies Elegance Rooms’ on its domestic fleet in 1996. As a result of their
findings that 35 percent of their domestic passengers are female, JAL
introduced separate restrooms which have additional features such as an
extra back mirror and a range of cosmetics (Kahn, 1997).
The Hotel Industry Experience
The hotel industry has already noted and reacted to the changing
structure of the business travellers. Previously the male business traveller
was the prime customer for whom most of the facilities and services were
provided. However, with the steady growth in the number of female
business travellers, many hotel chains have found it necessary to re-market
themselves by offering a more personalised service as well as additional
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Table 2. Percentage of Female Business Travellers, 1983-1996
Airport 1983 1987 1993 1996 %increase 1983-96
Heathrow 12% 14% 15% 20% 66%
Gatwick 15% 19% 20% 20% 33%
Stansted 13% 16% 13% 16% 23%
Source: CAA, 1996
facilities. This is in order to better accommodate the female who, it has
been discovered, has different wants and needs compared to the male.
One area of prime importance to the female is her personal safety. In a
survey of women frequent travellers by Chambers Travel (Bevan, 1996), it
was found that 95 percent of its respondents stressed safety as being highly
significant. Research commissioned by Barclaycard revealed that car parks
were singled out by many women as places in need of safety improvements
(Chetwynd, 1998). Some hotels such as the Renaissance and Choice groups
both reserve spaces near the hotel entrance for women. Copthorne has a
policy of escorting female travellers to and from its less well-lit car parks.
Several hotels in Tokyo have dedicated check-in desks for female
business travellers and include amenities in rooms which are more suited to
women. They also have tried to alleviate female’s concern over security in
hotels by offering women rooms nearer the lift so that they do not need to
walk through long hotel corridors. A survey by Swallow hotel group, on the
more important considerations for female travellers, has led them to devise
a women’s charter (Travel Trade Gazette, 1998). As a result of various
surveys on female business travellers by the hotel industry, an independent
hotel booking agency, Expotel, recently launched the “Woman Aware
Initiative.” Based on their scheme hotels are classed as “Woman Aware
Hotels” if they meet certain criteria based on the survey of 1,000 female
business travellers carried out by the agency (Anderson, 1999).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to address the questions raised in the introductory section, two
types of surveys were carried out.
One was a supply side survey that consisted of a postal questionnaire
survey of 44 airlines in North America and Europe with a 33 percent
response rate. The airlines included in the survey were all major scheduled
carriers with business class operation.
The other was a demand side survey that included a postal survey of 175
female business travellers resident in North America and Europe. The
potential respondents were contacted through personal contacts and
“Women in Business,” which is a club whose members are business
women. In addition to the postal survey, interviews with 15 female business
travellers in executive lounges at London Heathrow airport were carried
out. The reason for the face-to-face interviews was to gauge female
business passengers needs while they were actually travelling. Therefore, a
total of 190 female business travellers were surveyed with a 34 percent
response rate.
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The Airline Survey
A primary objective of the airline supply side survey was to obtain
information from airlines based in Europe and North America about their
current and future marketing activity aimed at the female business
travellers. With this objective in mind, the survey was designed to obtain
information in the following general question areas.
 On average, what percentage of ‘Business Class’ passengers are
female, for both short haul and long haul flights?
 Is the female business traveller becoming an important market for
airlines? If so, can airlines forecast the growth of this segment?
 Do airlines currently focus specific services on the female business
travellers? If so, what are they?
Questionnaires were sent to 44 airlines based in U.S. and Europe. An
above-average response rate of 33 percent was achieved.
In contrast to the non-U.S. airlines, the respondent U.S. carriers
indicated an above-average percentages of females, over 20 percent and 24
percent, using their business class services on both short and long haul
routes, respectively. This may suggest a greater acceptance of women in the
higher ranks of corporate institutions in the U.S. business environment. It
appears that on average 28 percent of business passengers of respondents
airlines operating from the U.S. are female. The corresponding figure for
the European carriers is 22 percent, as shown below.
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The survey results also indicated an overwhelming proportion of
respondent airlines (80 percent) believe that the female business travel
market is valuable and is transforming into a new prominent segment
within business class.
Having received such a positive response, it was intriguing to gain
further insight into the significance of this segment by asking the airlines
whether they had forecast the percentage growth in the number of female
business travellers by the turn of century.
Only half of the respondent airlines indicated that they had projected the
short term growth of female business travellers segment. The results
indicate a plausible average growth figure of 10 percent over the next two
years.
Considering that 80 percent of all respondents view the growing female
business travellers market as important, it was interesting to see whether
airlines are already focusing some of their attention on the female business
travellers by offering specific services and facilities for the female flyer, or
if they intend to do so in the future. Clearly, very little is being offered at
present as only 7 percent of carriers stated that they are currently dedicating
some of their resources to the female business travellers. However, what is
encouraging is that more airlines indicated an intention to do so in the
future (see Figure 2).
The results in relation to current services offered specifically to female
business travellers is illustrated in Figure 3.
In summary, the respondent airlines gave a clear indication that they
view the growth of female business travellers as important for their airline.
However, it appears that the majority of airlines have not yet devoted any
resources or formulated any policies to address any possible requirement of
female travellers. A few airlines have begun to take notice of the growing
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female travellers market by offering special services to them.
A number of larger global airlines drew attention to the fact that, even
though they were currently not offering any specific services for the female
business travellers, they may well decide to do so in the future. Having
identified the frequent business women traveller as a key new market, a few
implied that they were now in the information gathering stage and are
currently trying to identify new products for the female business travellers
market.
Female Business Travellers Survey
A total of 175 questionnaires were sent to female business travellers in
North America and Europe. In addition to that 15 face-to-face interviews
with female business travellers were made possible by permission of two
airlines, in their executive lounges at London Heathrow airport. The results
that are presented in this section are based upon a sample of 50 female
business travellers who participated in the questionnaire survey and 15
face-to-face interviews. Although this is a relatively small sample, it
highlights several issues which could be of interest to marketing and
product development managers in the airlines industry.
The Characteristics of Female Business Traveller
Based on the surveyed sample a large proportion of the female business
travellers are between 25 and 49 years of age (see Figure 4). These results
are supported by a survey undertaken by Plog Research, Inc. (1996) that the
percentage of female business travellers is higher in the younger age
10 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
Percentage
groups. In addition, their research identified an interesting correlation
between age and future travel plans. This stated that 31 percent of those
under the age of 44 plan to travel more in the future, while only 23 percent
of travellers over the age of 55 share that expectation. This indicates,
therefore, that as the female business travellers of today tend to be young, it
can be expected that they will travel even more on business in the future.
A large proportion of female business travellers (67 percent) are
employed by a company as opposed to being independent or self-
employed. Clearly, as illustrated in Figure 5, there is a tendency for female
business travellers to be in a position of authority. Indeed, this accounts for
over one-third of all females questioned. Some 27 percent of the
respondents stated that they are either a director or a vice president of a
company. However, there are still only a handful of females who are at the
head of companies with only 12 percent working as Chief Executive
Officer or Managing Director. This could be interpreted as suggesting that
the female is becoming more business orientated. As stated in the
introductory part of this paper the most popular university courses amongst
females in the U.K., as well as in America, are those relating to business
and financial issues (Office for National Statistics, UK, 1988-1995 and
U.S. Department of Education, 1996). Ultimately, this may have the effect
of steering even more females into a business environment, where flying
may become increasingly a necessity.
Only 4 percent of respondents earn less than US$20,000 per year while
nearly two-thirds claimed that they earn an annual income between
US$40,000 and US$80,000. Four percent received US$80,000 to
US$100,000 a year, while 13 percent stated that they earn above
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US$100,000 a year. This illustrates that although the females represent a
smaller proportion business travellers market the majority has senior
position with a relatively high income compared to average earnings in
U.S. and Europe.
Nearly one-half of the respondents fly over 10 times a year on business
purposes, with around 20 percent flying over 20 times per annum (see
Figure 6). Considering that at present the female business travellers only
makes up around 20 percent of the whole business travel segment, those
female business passengers travelling more than 20 times a year represent
only a very small proportion of the overall business travel market.
The majority of respondents (73 percent) indicated that they are the
primary decision-maker regarding the choice of airline. The class to be
12 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
flown is usually dependent on travel policy, with the duration of trip being
the deciding factor.
The Female Business Travellers’ Requirements
Having identified female business travellers’ characteristics in the
previous section, in this part of the study female business travellers
attitudes in relation to airline services are discussed. The survey obtained
information in the following general questions areas.
 What factors are important when choosing an airline?
 How does the female business traveller feel about the level of service
she is offered in comparison to their male counterparts?
 What are the particular requirements of the female when travelling on
business?
The results of the survey indicates that the majority of female business
travellers are loyal airline customers, as 62 percent of respondents stated,
they fly with their most preferred airline when possible. The importance of
the main factors which affects their choice of airline is shown in Figure 7.
As would be expected, it is the frequency of an airline’s flights that are
seen as most important. This provides for a certain flexibility when
travelling. Comparing this results with those of OAG Business Travel
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Survey (1998)1 it appears that female business travellers are more price
conscious than their male counterparts.
A large proportion of female business travellers appears to be happy
with the level of service they receive from airlines, in comparison with
those received by their male counterparts. However, the 21 percent of
respondents who claim to be treated unequally state that it is the airline staff
who are most commonly responsible for this. They believe that airline staff
is male orientated, mentioning that “Airline staff always take a male as
serious business, but not the female.” It is not just flight attendants who are
seen as causing this situation though. Ground staff, especially female
ground staff, are implicated too.
Although the majority of female business travellers are happy with the
service they receive from airlines, nearly 40 percent believed that female
business travellers have different travel needs compared to male business
travellers (see Figure 8). Despite that, it is apparent that the majority of
respondents (85 percent) do not wish airlines to offer them a separate
female business travellers service policy. This could be that a separate
service policy would tend to offend because it could be interpreted as being
patronising. Indeed, the majority of female business flyers want to be
treated in the same manner as the male traveller.
Of the factors important to female business travellers, airport security
appears to be a very important requirement to a large proportion of
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1 OAG survey (1998) indicated that factors influencing business passengers choice of airline,
in terms of priority, are: most convenient schedules; reputation for safety; punctuality; comfort;
FFP; efficient check-in; advance seat allocation; friendly cabin staff; cheap fares; lounges; food
and drink.
respondents. It once again underlines the fact that safety is the biggest
concern for female travellers. Many hotel chains have begun to address this
area by installing surveillance cameras in their car parks, or by
accompanying female customers to their vehicles. The Total Research
Corporation (1998) also found airport security to be of prime concern. They
conclude that it is not security on the aircraft that is the problem, but rather
when female business travellers arrive at their destination airport. Many
complain of arriving late and finding that security is lax and transport non-
existent. They feel that it is the airline’s responsibility to provide proper
security until they leave the airport premises.
Respondents have stated a preference for female washrooms on long
haul flights. These could provide the passenger with a washbasin and large
mirrors in a room designed for changing. Japanese Air Lines have installed
these on their domestic aircraft and this has been found to be very
successful.
Safety advice is also very important to nearly 40 percent of respondents.
However, what safety advice entails is unclear. Some qualitative answers
include advice on what public transport to use in order to get to certain
areas in a safe way, where and where not to go in a city, safe areas to walk
in, and taxi companies to use. Concern about female safety should be
treated as being of vital importance by airlines. One suggestion put forward
by a respondent was that passengers be offered destination-specific
information pamphlets during the flight which would include advice about
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the aspects discussed above. Not only would this be an added service, but
by treating safety as a serious issue, the airline’s image would also be
enhanced.
Suitable amenity packs, assistance with luggage, friendly airline staff
and more personal input to seat allocation is also important to over one-
quarter of the respondents. As discussed in the airline survey, only four
respondent airlines claim to offer female amenity packs.
In relation to airline staff, female business travellers are not looking for
special treatment, but as one respondent stated, “just ‘equal’ treatment by
the attendants would be a step forward.” In light of the fact that 70 percent
of respondents tend to choose their own airlines, a small improvement in
staff attitude could conceivably make a large difference to female business
flyers loyalty.
While separate female business travellers seating areas in either an
executive lounge or on board an aircraft would not be very popular, a more
personal input into seat allocation would be welcome. It is evident that for
short haul flights female business travellers are not very concerned about
whom they sit next to, but when flying long haul they would prefer to be
seated next to another female. In anticipation of sleeper cabins that may be
introduced on long haul aircraft in the future, it was interesting to ask the
question whether female business travellers would be happy to share a
cabin with another male passenger. It has become clear that 85 percent
would find this unacceptable. In addition, more than 60 percent stated that
they would not be prepared to pay extra in order to have a private cabin. The
majority of female business passengers would, therefore, see such facilities
as complementary.
CONCLUSIONS
Female business travellers are becoming an important and growing sub-
segment of business passenger market. Almost 28 percent and 22 percent of
the U.S. and European airlines business passengers are female. The
majority of respondent airlines recognise the potential of female business
travellers market but have not yet developed any specific policy geared
towards female travellers. Only a few airlines (7 percent of respondents)
have started to take notice of this segment of market by offering female
specific services.
The hotel industry appears to be ahead of airline industry as many major
hotels have already formulated policies targeted at satisfying female travel
needs.
The survey of female business travellers, 50 postal questionnaire
surveys and 15 face-to-face interviews, clearly indicated that while they are
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generally happy with airline services (nearly 80 percent), they would like to
see some improvements in certain areas. These included improvement in
advice on safety, security at airport, better washrooms on board an aircraft,
provision of female amenity packs and assistance with luggage. Security at
airports appears to be one of their prime concern.
The majority (82 percent of respondents) do not wish to be treated
differently by airline employees but would like to be treated in the same
manner as male business travellers. It appears that satisfying such a
requirement does not require large financial investments. Instead, an
airline’s staff must be trained to be more attuned to a female’s special
needs, and realise not all female travellers are leisure passengers or are
male business passengers companions.
Considering that female business travellers tend to be young, have
management positions and are loyal to their favourite airlines, they are
expected to travel more and for a long period on business in the future. Any
airline showing interest in their travel requirements will certainly position
itself in female business travellers’ minds as service orientated and caring.
Clearly, such positioning would have a positive impact on market share and
profit.
REFERENCES
Anderson, A. (1999, February 3). “An end to fear for women travellers?” Times Newspaper.
Bevan, K. (1996, April 11). “Security is the key issue.” Financial Times.
Chetwynd, C. (1998, May 7). “Equal but with different needs.” Financial Times, Business of
Travel section.
Civil Aviation Authority. (1996). Passengers at BHX, LGW, LHR, LCY, LTN, MAN & STN
Airports.
“Equality is paramount for female business travellers.” (1996, January 3). Travel Trade
Gazette.
“Facilities required for women travelling alone.” (1998, 4 November). Travel Trade Gazette.
Goffee, R. and Scase, R. (1985). “Women in Charge: the experience of female
entrepreneurs”, London: George Allend Unwin.
Hansard Society Report. (1990). “Women at the top,” London, A. L. Publishing Service.
IATA. (1998). Airline Economic Results and Prospects, Part 1, Airline Economic Task Force,
September.
Kahn, F. (1997, August 9). “Getting to the seat of the problem.” Financial Times.
“More CEOs want female directors.” Catalyst. Available on-line:
www.womenconnect.com/info/business/apr1895a_bus.htm
OAG. (1998). Business Travel Lifestyle Survey: Charting the trends of the international
business traveller.
Alamdari and Burrell 17
Office for National Statistics. (1988-1995). Annual Abstracts of Statistics. United Kingdom.
Plog Reserach, Inc. (1996). quoted in “Sizing up the Corporate Traveler.”
http://www.btnonline.com:8080/db_area/archives/1996/96111101.htm
Total Research Corporation. (1998 June). “Women business travellers, major profit
opportunities for hotels, airlines, car rental and airports.” Survey conducted by
International Travel Group, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.
U.S. Department of Education. (1996). National Center for Education Statistics. Digest of
Education Statistics.
United Airlines. (1998). Internal report based on research carried out by market research
Department (Carol Mantey, Senior Staff Analyst at United Airlines).
Webb, C. (1998, July 19). “Marketing yields to girl power.” The Sunday Times, 5.
“Women fail to make progress.” (1999, August 2). Travel Weekly.
“Women-only check-in at Tokyo hotel.” (1998, March 4). Travel Trade Gazette.
18 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
A FUZZY APPROACH TO
OVERBOOKING IN AIR
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ABSTRACT
A high load factor is important for airlines trying to maximise their profits without alienating
customers. The loss of revenue caused by empty seats cannot be recaptured. The aim of this
paper is to propose a method that minimises the unused seats and the denied boarding at the
same time for every single flight. This can be achieved by monitoring the booking process
during the days before the departure and by using an Inference Fuzzy System as an easy
decision support system to assist the revenue management analysts.
INTRODUCTION
A flight, like most services, is produced by an airline company while
supplying and cannot therefore be stored. If an aircraft takes off with some
empty seats, there is a loss of revenue that cannot be recaptured.
The marginal revenue of an extra passenger occupying a seat which
otherwise would have not been sold, is very large, while the additional
supported costs are very small. For this reason it is very important for the
airlines to reach a high load factor of the aircraft.
The problem is that even if a flight is sold out, that is, the aircraft
capacity matches exactly the number of booked seats, it is almost sure that
the aircraft will leave the gate with some empty seats. This happens because
some passengers do not appear to claim their seats the day of the departure
and some cancel their reservation too late to allow the company to sell the
seats again.
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To reduce these effects most airlines overbook their scheduled flights to
a certain extent in order to compensate for no-shows. As a consequence,
some passengers are sometimes left behind or bumped as a result. By
bumping passengers from an oversold aircraft, an airline can incur costs
ranging from nothing, if the excess passengers can be rebooked with the
same airline on a later flight that day, to meals, hotel rooms, vouchers for
free flights, and the cost of transportation on another airline, not
considering the potential loss of customer goodwill.
Overbooking and automated reservation systems are today an important
chapter of the yield management, which has become a basic tool for the
survival of the airlines in the air transport market, increasing today more
and more in competitiveness and complexity. It has been evaluated that in
the period from 1989 to 1992 American Airlines have saved through yield
management about 50 percent more than its net profit for the same period
(Davis, 1994).
Generally airlines accept reservation requests up to a booking limit, if
the number of initial reservations is less than the booking limit, and decline
the reservation requests otherwise.
As the number of no-shows is a stochastic variable, it is possible that the
passengers that show up are more than the available seats for the flight, thus
producing the opposite problem of the seat spoilage, that is, a number of
denied boarding. These may be voluntary, if a passenger with a confirmed
reservation accepts some kind of refund to abdicate the flight (money, hotel
accommodation, meals, etc.), otherwise is an involuntary denied boarding,
causing damages to the company image and additional costs.
Selling more seats than the aircraft’s capacity might be seen as an
incorrect behaviour, but the airlines sustain that without the balancing
factor of an overbooking policy, the load factors of the flight would be
lower than the actual one, thus producing an inevitable increase in the
average fares.
The problem we want to face in this paper is what kind of booking policy
should an airline adopt in the days before the departure in order to reduce
the double risk of empty seats and denied boarding. In other words the
company should establish what is the optimal authorisation level at any
given time before the take-off, that is, the optimum number of reservations
to be accepted.
The aim of this paper is to propose a method which minimises the
spoiled seats and the denied boarding at the same time for every single
flight. This can be achieved by monitoring the booking process during the
days before the departure and using an Inference Fuzzy System as an easy
decision support system to assist the revenue management analysts. This
allows an understanding of any unusual event or action taken by
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competitors for each flight from the opening of the reservations to the take-
off.
REVIEW OF THE EXISTING MODELS
Several models had been proposed in these last four decades based on
different approaches to match the objectives of the airline companies.
The cost minimisation model (Beckmann, 1958 and Kosten 1960 in
Holm, 1995) finds the optimal authorisation level as the one which
determines the minimum expected total cost of overbooking, calculated as
the sum of the cost due to denied boarding (that increases with the number
of accepted bookings) and the spoilage due to empty seats (that is reduced
instead).
In 1961, Thompson proposed a model to limit the probability of denied
boardings calculated as the area of a standard normal distribution of the
number of show-up passengers exceeding the aircraft capacity (Holm,
1995).
A similar approach was used by Taylor (1962), which takes into account
the ratio of denied boarding over the number of booked passengers as a
constraint not to be overcome, while Rothstein & Stone (1967) maximises
the expected revenue of the flight under the limit of an acceptable pre-set
risk of denied boarding.
The model made by Gerbracht (1979) for Continental Airlines selects
the optimum level of booking to maximise the expected net revenue as a
result of the revenue obtained from the passengers actually carried, and also
the penalty arising from the number of passengers with denied boarding.
Since the number of no-shows varies randomly for each flight, if the
probability distribution of no-shows is given, the statistical expected net
revenue can be maximised. As it is much more expensive to have a denied
boarding than to spoil an empty seat, the optimum booking levels are
always shifted toward low overbooking values with regard of the average
no-shows.
Alstrup (1986) considers different booking policy for different classes
of passengers (and fares) and models the booking process as a non-
homogenous Markovian chain. The aim is to find the optimal level of
booking to be adopted for each class and for each time interval.
Andersson (1989) treats the case of an aircraft with a flexible cabin
divided into fare classes, with different priority in respect of denied
boardings.
Dunleavy (1994) uses a classical probabilistic overbooking approach to
the determination of the marginal fare for a group and the uncostraining of
origin-destination fare level data within a seamless, bid-price environment.
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Reviewing the different overbooking models used by the airlines, we
note that they try to arrange a compromise between the aim of maximising
the net revenues with the need of assuring a more competitive level of
service, avoiding the denied boarding as much as possible. However most
of the proposed models are focused on determining the expected number of
no-shows in terms of probability distributions.
The ratio of denied boardings per 1,000 boarded passengers is often
used as an overbooking performance index. Although the airlines are
interested in keeping a fixed level of service, the basic aim is the revenue
maximisation. This is why it is becoming critical to monitor the booking
process in real-time in order to counterbalance changes and shifts from the
expected values of the process output variables (i.e., the mean show-up
rate). In fact the show-up rate is probabilistic, therefore uncertain, and
besides is the aggregate result of the available historical data. So a perfect
hit on every flight cannot be achieved on a probabilistic base. This why
often the airlines allow the intervention of a booking analyst that overrides
the automated system’s overbooking advice in order to embody common
feeling and human judgement in unusual situations.
Whatever is the method adopted, we believe that for a given flight the
limits of the authorisation level cannot be evaluated through static
considerations owing to the tightly dynamic nature of the booking process,
which requires a continuous check and change of these limits, in order to
suit the unpredictable passenger behaviour, which becomes more and more
changeable as the day of the take-off approaches.
Fuzzy Logic represents a very promising mathematical approach to
model a process characterised by subjectivity, uncertainty and imprecision.
The linguistic information expressed by a booking analyst is a subjective
knowledge which can hardly be incorporated in a classical mathematical
model. In the next section the basic fuzzy logic theory assumptions are
presented.
WHY USE FUZZY LOGIC
Introduction
Why should the fuzzy logic be applied to perform an optimal booking
policy for a flight?
If we ask a revenue management analyst how he settles the level of
booking authorisation to be adopted in the days before the aircraft take-off,
he probably would say that if he finds a low booking level, he makes the
decision to authorise a level of reservations which is more than the
aircraft’s capacity to compensate for the expected no-show passenger. If we
ask him what he means by a low booking level, he could say that this
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depends on many factors, such as the type of flight, the season, the ratio
between business passenger and leisure ones, but anyway, less than 50
percent of the aircraft capacity ten days before departure might be seen as a
low booking level. The question is if he will use a different overbooking
policy with a booking level of 51 percent. Actually he thinks that 50 percent
is a limit for unequivocally saying that an over-sale of seats must be done,
but for a lower level as well as for a higher booking level, an overbooking of
seats must be accepted.
In other words we see how this kind of problem requires that the
variables controlling the system must shift from a mathematical and
deterministic formalism to a linguistic representation based on fuzzy sets.
Actually fuzzy systems suit very well in modelling non-linear systems.
The nature of fuzzy rules and the relationship between fuzzy sets of
different shapes provides a powerful capability for the description of a
system whose complexity makes traditional expert system, mathematical,
and statistical approach very difficult.
The problem is now to manage the experience of the expert and to
transform it in a set of inference fuzzy rules expressing the dynamics of the
system we want to model. As Lotfi Zadeh (1973) said, “when the
complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and yet
significant statements about its behaviour diminishes until a threshold is
reached beyond which precision and significance become almost mutually
exclusive characteristics (Cox, 1994, p.2)”. The basic idea underlying the
Fuzzy Logic is that when we try to describe a system by a traditional model
we use mathematical variables, which represent the state of the system as
existing or not existing. If we represent the state of the system in terms of
fuzzy sets, and not in terms of discrete symbols and numbers, we can obtain
a representation of the system closer to human reasoning and the transition
from a system state to the next is more gradual.
Fuzzy Sets and Membership Functions
According to Fuzzy Logic, when a system is characterised by an
incomplete knowledge, the hypothesis is not only true or false, but are true
or false by a certainty factor.
The Fuzzy Set is a function indicating to what degree (between 0 and 1)
the value of a variable belongs to the set. A degree of zero means that the
value is not in the set, while a degree of one means that the value is
completely representative of the set. A membership function maps to what
degree of confidence each value belongs to the fuzzy set. It is important to
outline that the degree of confidence we are talking about is not to be
interpreted as a probability but as a degree of truth, that is, a measure of
compatibility of the value of a variable with an approximate set, and not the
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occurring frequency of that value.
Formally, if X is a set of elements indicated as x, a fuzzy set b of X is a set
of paired values as shown below:
b=[(x,µb(x) : x ˛ X]
µ
b
(x) is called membership function and it associates a degree of
confidence m to each value of x in b. For instance the curve of Figure 1 can
be seen as the degree of membership of each value of the booked seats of an
aircraft to the set “High booking level”. In this example, 50 percent and 150
percent are the limits of the so called interval of confidence.
Using the Fuzzy Set Theory it is possible to approximate the behaviour
of complex and non-linear systems, which otherwise would require a high
level of computational resources. At the same time it is possible to have a
model of the system very close to the human way of reasoning and to the
way experts themselves think about the decision process, while many
traditional expert and decision support systems lose fast comprehension as
the complexity of the system increases because they persist in applying
dichotomised rules with artificial and crisp boundaries.
We are talking of approximate (or possibilistic) reasoning, that is the
way the experts think. So trying to perform an optimal booking policy
during the period elapsing from the opening of the reservations of a flight
till the departure day, a revenue management analyst would give us
suggestions such as: if the booking level is low, and the rate of cancellation
is high, then the number of no-show passengers will be quite high. Actually,
the expert of the problem shows a knowledge of the system through
concepts without a well defined pattern, based on his sensations,
experience and intuitions, more than on precise data. Now the fact is that
fuzzy systems are able to directly manage these kind of imprecise
recommendations, reducing the distance that lies between the idea
expressed by an expert and the one coded in a conventional model.
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Figure 1. Fuzzy set of the booking level as percent of the aircraft capacity.
Another basic difference between a conventional expert system and a
fuzzy system is that the former has a series of statements which are
executed serially and is carried out with algorithms that reduce the number
of rules examined, while the second has a parallel processing and activates
all the rules at same time.
Fuzzy Rules
The fuzzy rules are the building blocks of a fuzzy system. A fuzzy rule is
a conditional proposition that settles a link between the fuzzy sets. Each
rule is appraised for its degree of truth and shares to the final output set.
The proposition has the general form,
if w is Z then x is Y
where w and x are scalar values and Z and Y are linguistic variables, i.e.,
fuzzy sets.
In this example w is the “process state”, while x is the “control action”.
The meaning of the statement is then,
x is a member of (the fuzzy set) Y to the degree that w is a
member of (the fuzzy set) Z.
The final solution fuzzy space is created by the collection of correlated
fuzzy propositions, called rules of inference, each contributing with its
degree of truth.
The main methods of inference used in fuzzy systems are the min-max
method and the fuzzy additive method.
The min-max rules of implication
By this method, the contribution of the antecedent part to the consequent
fuzzy region is restricted to the minimum, that it, to the smaller value of the
grades of inputs, while the final output region is obtained as a maximum,
that it, by summing the fuzzy sets region corresponding to each rule.
The fuzzy additive rules of implication
The fuzzy additive compositional operation is a slightly different
approach as the output fuzzy region is bounded by [1,0], so that the result of
any addition cannot exceed the maximum truth value of a fuzzy set.
Both methods reduce the level of truth of the output fuzzy region
activated by the relevant rule of inference
Methods of decomposition and defuzzification
Using the general rules of inference, the evaluation of a proposition
produces one fuzzy set associated with each model solution variable. To
find the actual scalar value representing the solution, the method of
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defuzzification is used. It is the final step of the fuzzy reasoning. As shown
in Figure 2, this is obtained through an aggregation process that produces
the final fuzzy regions, which have to be decomposed using one of the
defuzzification methods.
There are different defuzzification functions, some computing the
centroid of the output sets, some averaging the maximum points of the
output sets. However, each of them inevitably results a compromise
between the need to find a single point outcome and the loss of information
that such process produces, by reducing to a single dimension the output
region solution.
FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEM
Building a Fuzzy Inference System
There are five main steps that must to be carried out to build a Fuzzy
Inference System (FIS):
1. to choose the system variables (control variables for the input and
solution variable for the output);
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2. to define the fuzzy sets (number, shape and confidence intervals of
the membership functions);
3. to write the relationships between the input and the output (inference
rules);
4. to defuzzify to get the value of the solution;
5. to run a simulation of the model.
Choose the system variables
One of the most difficult parts to achieving a good formulation of the
problem is identifying the data which influence the operation of the system
and those which represent the output value of the model.
In this paper an overbooking fuzzy model has been constructed by
selecting as control variables (input) the following:
 the booking level (BL) at a given time, that is, the difference between
the total number of people who had booked a seat from the opening of
the reservation period and the one who had cancelled it (in percent of
the aircraft capacity); and
 the rate of cancellation (CR) at a given time, that is, the ratio between
the number of people who had cancelled their reservation and those
who had booked.
The number of no-show passengers (NS) in percent of the aircraft
capacity is assumed as the solution variable (output).
A scheme of the proposed model is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Fuzzy Inference System.
Define the Fuzzy Sets
The shape of the fuzzy set is quite important, but most models do not
show a very wide sensitivity to it. Triangular, trapezoid or bell curves are
often used. Neural networks models have been used to find natural
membership functions in the data and thus automatically creating fuzzy
surfaces.
It is convenient to use a wide and elastic domain rather than a restrictive
one.
To obtain a smooth and continuous control of the output variable a
suitable degree of overlap of each fuzzy set should be assured.
Write the Inference Rules
The rules that activate the same solution fuzzy set are grouped together.
The application of a rule of inference that gets the shape of the consequent
(output fuzzy set) as a result of the implication of the antecedent is reported
in Figure 4. The implication form used is a minimum function, called an
implication of Mamdani.
Aggregation of the Rules
The application of each rule determines an adjusted fuzzy set of the
consequent part. The final conclusion is then derived by summing the fuzzy
sets of the conclusion of each rule, by a process called determining MAX
(maximum) deriving from the application of the inference rules
Defuzzification
This step selects the expected crisp value of the solution (output) from
the fuzzy region resulting from the aggregation of the fuzzy sets each
activated by all the rules applied in parallel.
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Figure 4. Application of an inference rule.
There are several methods of defuzzification, but the most widely used
is the method of the centroid, where the abscissa of the centre of gravity of
the output fuzzy set region represents the balance point of the solution.
THE AIRLINE BOOKING PROCESS
The booking process, from an airline company point of view, is rather
complex. From a microeconomic point of view it is an economic
interaction between the consumer (the potential air traveller) who tries to
maximise his utility function under some given factors (travel dates, price,
service and restrictions) and the airline trying to maximise its profit.
In the weeks before the departure many reservations are made for each
type of fare. As the time of departure approaches some cancellations are
added to the new reservations. Moreover at the day of departure there are
additional complications due to travellers who show up without a
reservation (go-show), travellers who fail to show-up (no-show) and
travellers who are inserted in a waiting list. Furthermore there are many
external factors which affect the booking process, such as different fare
levels for each class, flight frequency, season or type of aircraft.
When the spaces corresponding to a certain fare class are filled, the
request of travel is denied, but the airline (or the reservation agent) can try
to recapture the traveller on a different class or on a different flight in the
requested fare class. Nevertheless the actual number of boarded people
depends also on the level of authorisation which has been adopted during
the booking process.
A typical flow chart of a booking process is shown in Figure 5.
The result of the economic interaction between potential customers and
the airline is a certain number of reservations and cancellations in each
class on each flight.
Without any specific mathematical effort, a Fuzzy Inference System is
able to incorporate all these factors, affecting the problem, as they are
perceived by an expert (marketing specialist).
The booking process is divided into N time intervals of unequal length,
that it, the duration each interval decreases as the departure date
approaches.
Most airlines keep a record of some data describing the evolution of this
process. A large number of such intervals is computationally impractical,
while a small number allows no adjustment for differences between
forecast and actual bookings as the booking history for each flight
develops. Alitalia Airline holds an historical flight database where the
booking process is photographed by 13 pictures. Pictures with their
relevant time intervals are indicated in Table 1. Time intervals have a
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Table 1. Pictures of the Flight, as Used by Alitalia Airline Booking Process
Picture Days to Departure
1 342-90
2 89-60
3 59-43
4 42-23
5 22-13
6 12-7
7 6-5
8 4-4
9 3-3
10 2-2
11 1-1
12 0-0
13 check in
decreasing width. This is why airlines need to improve the monitoring
resolution of the booking process, because, as the day of departure
approaches, the possibility of managing the variability of the process is
reduced.
In details, Alitalia reservation data contain company, flight number,
origin and destination, day of the week, type of aircraft, compartment (i.e.
top, business, economy), booking class, picture number (from 1 to 13),
event code, date of departure, and value of the event.
The events recorded for each picture are
B = actual booked passengers, that it, the difference between
reservations and cancellations;
C = cancelled passengers;
N = No-Show at departure, booked at the relevant picture; and
G = Go-Show are the total passengers appearing at the
departure (picture 13) without reservation.
The effective number of boarded passengers is the minimum between
the physical compartment capacity and the term (B+G-N).
A typical example of average historical booking flight data is shown in
Figure 6.
The Booking Level is the cumulative sum of B relevant for each picture.
The Cancellation Rate is the ratio of the cumulative sum of the total
cancelled seats to the reserved ones. The falling down of the booking curve
at the 13th picture is the effect of passengers who do not show up at the day
of departure.
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Figure 6. Average of historical booking database.
The shape of the booking curve for a specific class on a given flight
depends on several factors. In fact, it is important how early before take-off
the reservations are made. Leisure travellers usually book early, while
business men late. Furthermore it is important to know that a large amount
of cancellations occurs as a consequence of discouraging penalty for lower
fare classes or as a consequence of the high cancellation rates and no-show
rates observed for the higher fares.
The slope of the curve is steeper near a restriction expiration for lower
fares and near the very last few days for higher fares. The booking limits
tend to flatten the curve and the airline loses information about the shape of
the real curve based on unconstrained demand
The fact that, occasionally in the example shown, the average
overbooked seats coincide with the average no-show level is scarcely
meaningful, as it might be the average result of flights with many denied
boardings and flights with many empty seats. The goal for a effective
forecasting policy is to get the “perfect fit” for each flight.
THE FUZZY INFERENCE OVERBOOKING MODEL
Following the Fuzzy Inference System concepts, a Fuzzy Inference
Overbooking Model has been built. The experience coming from the
historical data of a flight reservation process that has been incorporated to
construct the membership functions and writing the rules as previously
discussed. The No-Show Level as a function of the Cancellation Rate and
as a function of the Booking Level are plotted respectively in Figure 7 and
in Figure 8, for a set of historical data of a typical booking process. The
chart’s data include 33 flights and 12 pictures per flight. All data are
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Figure 7. No-Show Level as a function of the Cancellation Rate.
referred to the Roma-New York Alitalia link and range from April to
December 1993.
As shown by these charts, there is a substantial growth trend of the No-
Show Level both with the Booking Level and with the Cancellation Rate.
The number of no-show, as percentage of the cabin capacity, seem to be a
function of how much the cabin is engaged and how much passengers tend
to reject their reservation. This means that the evolution of the booking
process depends fundamentally on the state of the process, described by the
Booking Level and by the Cancellation Rate, while the dependency from
the time is weak.
For the modelling of the system the following input control variables has
been chosen: the booking level (BL) at any time before departure, as the
total reservations made up to that time minus the total cancellations (in
percent of the aircraft capacity); and the cancellation rate (CR) at any time
before departure, as the ratio of the number of people who had cancelled
their reservation to those who had booked (C/B for each picture).
The number of no-show passenger (NS) in percent of the aircraft
capacity is the solution variable (output).
Hereby follow the nine rules of the Inference Fuzzy System, as they
could be suggested by a booking process expert:
1. If (Cancellation Rate is Low) and (Booking Level is Low) then (No-Shows
Level is Low)
2. If (Cancellation Rate is Low) and (Booking Level is Medium) then (No-Shows
Level is Low)
3. If (Cancellation Rate is Low) and (Booking Level is High) then (No-Shows
Level is Medium)
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Figure 8. No-Show Level as a function of the Booking Level.
4. If (Cancellation Rate is Medium) and (Booking Level is Low) then (No-Shows
Level is Low)
5. If (Cancellation Rate is Medium) and (Booking Level is Medium) then (No-
Shows Level is High)
6. If (Cancellation Rate is Medium) and (Booking Level is High) then (No-Shows
Level is High)
7. If (Cancellation Rate is High) and (Booking Level is Low) then (No-Shows
Level is Medium)
8. If (Cancellation Rate is High) and (Booking Level is Medium) then (No-Shows
Level is High)
9. If (Cancellation Rate is High) and (Booking Level is High) then (No-Shows
Level is High)
In Figure 9 the input and output fuzzy sets activated by the parallel
action of each rule with the corresponding aggregated fuzzy regions are
shown, while the final solution is obtained as defuzzification with the
centroid method. It can see how a Cancellation Rate of 75 percent and a
Booking Level of 120 percent do not activate the rules from 1 to 4 and rule
7, while the remaining four rules contribute to the final result. Only the
fuzzy set high in the No-Show level is activated in the output variable and
applying the defuzzification procedure we obtain the final crisp result
which is a No-Show level of 14.4 percent. All the percentages in the
horizontal axes are referred to the aircraft seat capacity, while the vertical
axes indicates the level of activation of the relevant rule.
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Figure 9. Application of the FIS rules.
Finally Figure 10 shows the surface representing a three dimensional
view of the overbooking model. It represents the outcome of the application
of the FIS rules for each combination of the input variables.
The model has been constructed using the software Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox, which is an extension of the MATLAB software application.
Using this fuzzy model an optimal booking policy can be adopted, by
dynamically modifying the booking limit for the reservations that can be
authorised in each time interval of the booking process. The authorisation
level to be adopted for each picture is the sum of the cabin capacity and the
number of no-show as calculated by the fuzzy model.
NEURO-ADAPTIVE FUZZY INFERENCE SYSTEMS
As already said, the fuzzy sets (number, shape, range and overlapping)
and the fuzzy rules are built by the co-operation of an expert and a fuzzy
engineer, which traduces the experience into the fuzzy model. Otherwise it
is possible to automate the process using a procedure based on the neural
networks, such as the ANFIS function, contained in the Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox of MATLAB. This is a Neuro-Adaptive Fuzzy Inference System
essentially constituted of a fuzzy inference system, whose rules and
membership functions are derived by a back-propagation algorithm based
on some collection of input-output data. By this way the fuzzy system is
able to learn from the example data, applying some optimisation routines to
reduce the error between the data and the fuzzy system output.
To carry out this learning procedure a fuzzy inference system has to be
specified, or alternatively, if no supposition can be made on how the initial
membership functions should be, it is possible to use the command genfis1,
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which will examine the training data set and then generate a FIS matrix
based on the given numbers and types of membership functions. The
membership functions of the input variables are uniformly distributed in
the range of the training data. Of course this procedure requires that a large
amount of historical data are available.
A Neuro Adaptive Fuzzy Inference System has been built using the
Alitalia reservation database for the flight Rome-New York in 1993. A
simple program has been written in the internal MATLAB language to
demonstrate that a fuzzy inference system can be adopted to simulate the
booking process of a flight. Two main aspects can be pointed out: it can be
easily and rapidly built; and it is a good approximation of the intrinsic
complexity of the problem.
The program is reported in the Appendix.
As it can be seen in Figure 11, using a set of training data, ANFIS is able
to approximate the booking process, showing a clear growth in the No-
Show Level for increasing values of the Booking Level and of the
Cancellation Rate.
CONCLUSIONS
A fuzzy approach to the overbooking problem in air transportation has
been presented.
The aim is to show that a complex system, such as the booking process,
can be better controlled in terms of fuzzy sets than crisp numbers and
mathematical models.
The underlying idea is that the notion of high booking level or low no-
show level may change from day-to-day, flight-to-flight, airlines-to-
airlines, season-to-season, but the logic is always the same and is contained
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in the inference rules. Therefore the method can be easily tuned just
shifting the fuzzy sets averages or the intervals of confidence.
It has been shown the capability of the function ANFIS, contained in the
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB, as a simple instrument to build an
adaptive fuzzy inference system. When you try to approximate a function
with an adaptive fuzzy inference system, there are several parameters that
you can vary, some relevant to the fuzzy system, such as number and shape
of the membership functions, or the method of inference and
defuzzification, some relevant to the training method, such as the number
or the sequence of the training data. It would be worthwhile to carry out
some analysis to find out which is the best configuration of these
parameters to obtain the best approximation.
The model has been built considering only a fare class of passengers,
while in reality it would be better to extend the forecast of total bookings
for each fare class.
A problem that should be investigated with more detail is the
consequence of setting limits on the number of seats that can be sold. As a
result, the airline companies can only evaluate the accepted demand, while
no observation can be made on the demand that was turned away.
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APPENDIX
% function overb(dati,numMf,epochs,outputfile)
%
% dati = input matrix + output (last column)
% numMf = number di membership functions for the input (i.e. [3 2 4])
% epochs = number of iterations
% outputfile = name of the output file with .fis extension
%
function overb(dati,numMf,epochs,outputfile)
data=dati;
y=data(:,size(data,2));
NumInput = size(data,2) - 1;
TrainData = data;
NumMfs = numMf;
MfType = str2mat(‘trapmf’);
for i=1:NumInput-1,
MfType = [MfType’ str2mat(‘trapmf’)’]’;
end
NumEpochs = epochs;
StepSize = 0.1;
InputFismat = genfis1(TrainData, NumMfs, MfType);
close all;
for i = 1:NumInput;
subplot(NumInput, 1, i);
plotmf(InputFismat, ‘input’, i);
xlabel([‘input ’ num2str(i) ’ (’ MfType(i, :) ’)’]);
end
title(‘Initial fuzzy sets’);
OutputFismat = anfis(TrainData, InputFismat, [NumEpochs nan StepSize]);
yy = evalfis(data(:,1:NumInput), OutputFismat);
figure;
plot(1:size(y,1),y,‘o’,1:size(y,1),yy,‘x’);
legend(‘real’,’simulated’);
title(’Real system vs. simulated system’);
figure;
for i = 1:NumInput;
subplot(NumInput, 1, i);
plotmf(OutputFismat, ’input’, i);
xlabel([‘input ’ num2str(i) ‘ (’ MfType(i, :) ‘)’]);
end
title(‘Final fuzzy sets’);
writefis(OutputFismat,outputfile);
end
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DETERMINANTS OF PRICE DISPERSION
IN U.S. AIRLINE MARKETS
Gerald N. Cook
Miami, Florida
ABSTRACT
Although a well recognized and unpredicted post deregulation development, the complex
airline fare structure has received relatively little research attention. This paper develops a
multiple regression model measuring the relationship of several market variables to the
degree of ticket price dispersion observed in the 200 largest U.S. airline markets during the
third quarter of 1995. A wide range of ticket prices is evident on most routes. The results
show that ticket price dispersion on some given route increases with the number of
competitors, with service by a combination of non-stop and connecting flights, when a low-
cost airline competes with other major carriers, and when the capacity of one of the airports is
limited by regulation. The model explains 41 percent of observed ticket price dispersion.
INTRODUCTION
Two air travelers discover in casual conversation that one paid several
times more for her ticket than did the other, not an uncommon experience.
The great assortments of ticket prices available for a given flight, along
with the perplexing purchase restrictions attached to all but the highest
fares, confuse and frustrate many passengers. This paper employs a
regression analysis to estimate the relationship between the degree of price
dispersion on the 200 largest U.S. airline markets and several market
variables. While the results generally confirm those of the seminal studies
of airline price dispersion, the introduction of two new independent
variables greatly increases the explanatory power of the regression.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The complexity of airline ticket prices is a major and completely
unanticipated development which followed the deregulation of domestic
airline industry in 1978. During 40 years of economic regulation, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) approved domestic fares based on a simple,
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mileage-based formula which cross-subsidized short and low density
routes from high density, long haul markets (Levine, 1987). Although rare,
limited price competition gradually emerged. Capital Airlines’ introduction
of coach fares with high density seating and few amenities in the late 1940s
was quickly matched by other carriers. In the 1950s, the San Francisco-Los
Angeles market grew rapidly after regulated carriers were allowed to match
the fares offered by unregulated intrastate carrier Pacific Southwest
Airlines (Cross, 1995). In response to the threat of non-scheduled airlines
offering low fares and Spartan service in high density markets, the CAB
approved American Airlines’ Super Saver fares in 1977 at discounts
approaching 50 percent of the existing fare. The success of the Super Saver
in attracting price sensitive passengers led to speedy approval of similar
discount fares by other carriers and accelerated the process of deregulation
(Petzinger, 1995). Over the next few years, American became ever more
adept in segmenting business from leisure passengers, charging each a
price which maximizes revenue. By the early 1980s, American
successfully defended its markets against encroachment by a spate of new
entrants, low-cost carriers, most notably People Express.
Ever more sophisticated software programs designed to optimize
revenue, generally known as yield management systems, are now employed
by every major carrier and considered essential to financial success. By
continuous comparison of current reservation levels for each future flight
against historical booking curves, the yield management system
dynamically allocates the number of seats available at various prices
(Brumelle & McGill, 1993; Harris, 1995; Smith, Leimkuhler, & Darrow,
1992).
The highly complex fare structures which have evolved from the
implementation of yield management systems surprised deregulation
proponents. Pointing to then existing unregulated intrastate airlines as
exemplars, deregulation advocates predicted an industry characterized by
high flight frequency along linear route systems with low, simple fares
(Bailey, Graham, & Kaplan, 1985; Borenstein, 1992; Kahn, 1988; Levine,
1987). Rather than a simple system of peak and off-peak fares like those
pioneered by former intrastate carriers such as Southwest Airlines
(Petzinger, 1995), passengers face a bizarre array of fares on any given
flight.
Post deregulation changes in airline marketing, route structure,
concentration, and average fares have received extensive research attention.
Most studies confirm an aggregate improvement in consumer welfare;
however, the benefits are not uniformly distributed. Service increases and
real price reductions in major markets are balanced by the opposite result in
many low density routes. Hub and spoke route systems provide increased
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frequency but at the cost of fewer non-stop flights (see Morrison &
Wintson, 1995, for a review). Although the dramatic changes in ticket price
structure are well recognized, fare dispersion has attracted relatively few
researchers. Evans and Kessides (1993b) present data showing the ratio of
90th to 10th percentile yields (ticket price per mile) increased 76 percent in
the ten years following industry deregulation. Ratios of other percentiles
show a similar but less striking increase. Perhaps as interesting, they also
report greater range of ticket prices for established carriers than for new
entrants. The established carriers charge higher prices at the 90th percentile
and lower prices at the 10th percentile. These data show, as Evans and
Kessides and others have suggested, that established carriers effectively
employ price discrimination to compete with new entrants.
Borenstein and Rose (1994), analyzing domestic airline price data from
the second quarter of 1986, find expected absolute difference in fares
between two passengers on a route is 36 percent of the airline’s average
ticket price. Consistent with models of monopolistically competitive price
discrimination, competitive routes exhibit more price dispersion; however,
higher market density and concentrations of tourist passengers reduce
dispersion. (Borenstein, 1985; Gale, 1993; Holmes, 1989) Other results
show dispersion in an airline’s ticket prices on a route varies directly with
average fare and carrier dominance of airport endpoints. Borenstein and
Rose’s multiple regression analysis accounts for less than 20 percent of the
observed price variance inviting further exploration.
In a similar more recent study, Hayes and Ross (1998) find competition
from premier low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines reduces route price
dispersion. Unfortunately, the large number of independent variables
employed in their regression yields ambiguous and conflicting results for
other measures of market power, structure, and cost.
MODEL
The model regresses ticket price dispersion computed for each route
between airports serving the largest two hundred U.S. airline markets.
Because several cities are served by more than one airport, the sample
includes 338 individual routes. The dispersion statistic is coefficient of
variation (DISP), the sample standard deviation of ticket prices divided by
the sample mean price. Borenstein and Rose (1994, p. 655) use a somewhat
more complex measure of dispersion (Gini coefficient) but note similar
results with other dispersion statistics including the coefficient of variation.
The regression equation to be estimated is:
DISP = B0 + B1HERF + B2NONSTP + B3LOCSTtr + B4ALTLOCST +
B5 DIST + B6HUB + B7SLOT + B8VAC + e.
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The independent variable hypotheses discussed next are also
summarized in Table 1.
Route Concentration (HERF)
Though the industry is intensely competitive, many product attributes
differentiate individual airline flights. The literature suggests: (a) the
number and timing of flights in each market; (b) routing whether non-stop,
direct (no change of plane), or connecting; and (c) frequent flyer programs
are important attributes, particularly for business travelers. Others include
airport facilities, ground and in-flight service, reputation and image, type of
aircraft, and geographical dominance of computer reservation system
(Abramowitz & Brown, 1993; Borenstein, 1991, 1992; Levine, 1987).
Because passengers will value these attributes differently, they can be
expected to display varying degrees of brand loyalty. An airline with high
brand loyalty of one or more passenger segments may decide to meet
competition by lowering its prices more for passenger segments with
higher cross elasticity than for other segments, thus increasing ticket price
dispersion. Therefore, an inverse relationship between market
concentration and price dispersion is anticipated.
The Herfindahl index (HERF), a commonly employed metric in airline
economic studies, was computed from the raw data as the measure of
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Table 1. Summary of Regression Variables for Price Dispersion
in U.S. Airline Markets
Dependent Variable Abbreviation
Ticket Price Dispersion DISP
Independent Variables Abbreviation Predicted sign Relationship
Distance DIST + Square root
Concentration HERF - Linear
Non-stop competition NONSTP + Parabolic
Direct low-cost competition LOCSTtr + Parabolic
Indirect low-cost competition ALTLOCST + Linear
Hub dominance HUB + Linear
Capacity controlled airport SLOT + Linear
Vacation route VAC - Linear
market concentration. This statistic is the sum of the squared market shares
of all carriers operating on a route. For example, the Herfindahl index of a
route with three carriers each capturing an equal market share is:
(1/3)2 + (1/3)2 + (1/3)2 = 0.3333 or
I
N
=
å
11
Si2, where Si = market share of ith carrier.
Proportion of Non-stop Flights (NONSTP)
The hub and spoke route structure common to all major carriers except
Southwest Airlines obliges an airline to connect most of its markets with a
stop at its hub(s). Although the majority of flights to and from the hub(s)
will operate non-stop, an airline can also choose to operate non-stop flights
for competitive advantage in some markets.
Because passengers value the time savings and convenience of non-stop
flights, carriers operating non-stop flights in competition with carriers
requiring a connection should enjoy a competitive advantage reflected in
higher ticket prices. Likewise, carriers offering connecting flights may
have to offer lower fares to optimize revenues. Price dispersion, therefore,
should be related to the proportion of passengers traveling on non-stop
flights. Because this relationship has not been previously employed in the
literature, peak dispersion is hypothesized to occur when competition is
most intense with 50 percent of passengers traveling on non-stop flights
while the remainder connect through a hub airport. The variable
NONSTOP was computed equal to the sample proportion of passengers
traveling non-stop minus this proportion squared. This parabolic function
should be positively correlated to price dispersion.
Competition from Low-cost Airline (LOCSTtr)
Windle & Dresner (1995) and Dresner, Lin, & Windle (1996) find a
substantial and sustained decrease in average ticket price with the entry of a
low-cost carrier on a route. They also showed a significant, though smaller,
effect from low-cost carrier operation on a competing route. Because
incumbent major carriers are likely to meet such competition by lowering
discount fares more than unrestricted fares, a positive correlation of
competition from a low-cost carrier and price dispersion is anticipated. On
the other hand, low-cost carriers, particularly Southwest, dominate many
routes enjoying a monopoly on some. Because high route concentration is
expected to reduce price dispersion, the overall relationship between low-
cost carrier market share and price dispersion should be a parabolic
Cook 43
function of the form: LOCST–(B)(LOCST2) where LOCST is the market
share of the low-cost competitor. A preliminary regression established the
coefficient B at 1.68. Final regression results employed the transformed
variable LOCSTtr equal to LOCST–1.68(LOCST2).
As used in this research, a low-cost carrier is a post-deregulation
interstate airline competing primarily on the basis of price. Table A1 of the
Appendix lists those carriers meeting this definition in 1995.
Low-cost Competition on Competing Routes (ALTLOCST)
In some cities, low-cost carriers have not been able to obtain access to
the area’s major, and frequently preferred, airport, but offer competing
service from a secondary airport. In Chicago, for example, O’Hare
International Airport has only one low-cost carrier, but several low-cost
carriers, including Southwest Airlines, operate from Midway Airport.
ALTLOCST is the market share of the low cost carrier(s) on a directly
competing route. Its coefficient should be positive.
Square Root of Distance ( DIST)
The shorter the route, the more viable are automobile and other surface
transportation as substitutes for air travel. As the direct and imputed cost of
the traveler’s time increases with distance, however, both business and
time-constrained leisure travelers find few substitutes for air travel. Surface
transportation substitutes, therefore, should constrain the range of ticket
prices in both the leisure and business segments on shorter distance markets
with rapidly diminishing effect as distance increases. The square root of the
distance in hundreds of miles is taken as the predictor variable. The
coefficient of distance should be positive.
Hub Airport as an Endpoint (HUB)
Many studies show that major carrier hub dominance is related to higher
average fares to and from the hub airport, a result generally attributed to a
premium charged to business passengers traveling on the dominant hub
carrier (Bailey & Liu, 1995; Berry, 1990; Borenstein, 1989, 1990, 1991;
Brueckner, Dyer, & Spiller, 1992; Evans & Kessides, 1993a; Kahn, 1993).
If the hub carrier extracts a premium business fare, ticket price dispersion
should be higher on routes with a hub airport as an endpoint. HUB is a
dummy variable with a value of 1 if either the origin or destination (an
endpoint) is a hub airport of a major airline.
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Capacity Controlled Airport (SLOT)
Due to airport congestion and air traffic control limitations, the Federal
Aviation Administration allots a limited number of takeoff and landings
(slots) to air carriers at four major U.S. airports: New York LaGuardia and
Kennedy, Washington National, and Chicago O’Hare. To this list, Los
Angeles Orange County Airport, which is similarly restricted by local
government, has been added.
As would be expected, previous studies have shown higher average fares
on routes to or from capacity controlled airports (Abramowitz & Brown,
1993; Morrison & Winston, 1990). These airports, however, only operate at
capacity during peak demand hours, typically early morning and late
afternoon. Fares for flights during these hours will be higher than at airports
with excess capacity. During other hours, however, airlines can add flights
to accommodate the leisure elastic demand market segments. As a result,
price dispersion is expected to be positively correlated to this variable.
SLOT is dummy variable with a value of 1 if either the origin or destination
is a capacity controlled airport and 0 otherwise.
Vacation Destination (VAC)
Leisure passengers predominate on routes to and from vacation
destinations. The low proportion of business travel on these routes limits
the revenue potential of higher unrestricted fares generally purchased by
business passengers. Following Windle and Dresner (1995), vacation
routes are defined as those with an endpoint in Florida, Nevada, Hawaii, or
Puerto Rico. The coefficient of VAC is hypothesized to be negative. VAC is
a dummy variable with a value of 1 if either the origin or destination is
predominately a vacation or leisure travel location.
Table A2 of the Appendix lists the origin/destination airport
characteristics employed the regression.
DATA
The data are a ten percent random sample of U.S. airline domestic
passenger tickets for the third quarter of 1995 drawn from the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination Survey, Databank
1A (DOT, 1996). The data include: (a) origin, destination, and intermediate
stop(s), if any; (b) airline; (c) one-way ticket price or half of round-trip fare
and number of passengers traveling at each fare; and (d) total itinerary
distance and direct distance between origin and destination. The database
was filtered to obtain: (a) the top 200 domestic origin and destination
markets but excluding airport pairs within these markets of less than ten
sample passengers; (b) single carrier tickets excluding connections
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between airlines; (c) domestic itineraries excluding international and
domestic portion of international travel; (d) coach tickets excluding first
class; and (e) tickets of more than $10 excluding those of lesser amount
presumed to be frequent flyer or other promotional fares.
By examination, fares for one route, Dallas Love Airport to Los Angeles
International, were judged not representative of the population and
excluded from the analysis because of large directional fare disparity.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics, presented in Table 2, confirm Borenstein and
Rose’s (1994) finding of substantial ticket price dispersion. The mean of
the coefficient of variation across all routes is 21 percent ranging from a
high of 58 percent on the New York Kennedy to Palm Beach, Florida, route
to a negligible variance on the route from Chicago’s Midway Airport to
Indianapolis, a Southwest Airlines monopoly. Notably, of the 20 routes
with the lowest price dispersion, Southwest served all but two and enjoyed
a monopoly or faced only insignificant competition (average Herfindahl
index of 0.995). Twelve of these twenty routes originated from Southwest’s
home field, Dallas Love Airport.
The mean of the Herfindahl Index is .58 or the equivalent of 1.72 carriers
serving the average route. Sixty-five of the 338 routes have a Herfindahl
index of 0.9 or greater indicative of either monopoly or insignificant
competition. Fifty-four routes have an index of less than 0.33 or the
equivalent of three or more carriers with equal market share competing on
the route. Of the eleven routes with an index of 0.2 or less, ten are routes
from New York or Washington, D.C.
Just over 25 percent of all passengers traveled on low cost carriers; 142
of the 338 routes had no low cost competition. Seventeen routes were low
cost carrier monopolies; low cost carriers held more than a 90 percent
market share on 49 routes.
Hub, capacity controlled, and vacation airports accounted for 60
percent, 33 percent, and 23 percent of all routes respectively.
Regression Results
The results of the regression are presented in Table 3. The regression
equation and four of the eight independent variables are highly significant
(F = 30.64, p = 0.0000; HERF, T = -6.4, p = .0000; NONSTP, T = 3.3,
p = .0011; LOCSTtr, T = 3.1, p = .0019; SLOT, T = 3.6, p = .0003). The
signs of the coefficients for the significant variables are as predicted. The
46 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
Cook 47
Ta
bl
e
2.
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
ist
ic
so
ft
he
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
o
fP
ri
ce
D
isp
er
sio
n
in
U.
S.
A
ir
lin
e
M
ar
ke
ts
,1
99
5
St
at
D
IS
P
D
IS
T
H
ER
F
N
O
NS
TP
LO
CS
Tt
r
AL
TL
O
CS
T
H
U
B
SL
O
T
VA
C
M
ea
n
0.
21
52
3
27
.4
63
7
0.
57
69
1
0.
06
29
2
-
0.
08
48
0.
18
56
8
0.
60
94
7
0.
33
13
6
0.
22
78
1
St
d
Er
ro
r
0.
00
65
2
0.
58
24
9
0.
01
36
5
0.
00
38
3
0.
01
34
2
0.
01
93
2
0.
02
65
8
0.
02
56
4
0.
02
28
5
M
ed
ia
n
0.
20
51
5
24
.8
29
3
0.
50
59
5
0.
03
51
7
0
0
1
0
0
M
od
e
#N
/A
17
.2
04
7
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
St
d
D
ev
0.
11
98
4
10
.7
08
9
0.
25
09
3
0.
07
04
3
0.
24
66
3
0.
35
52
6
0.
48
85
9
0.
47
14
0.
42
00
4
Sa
m
pl
e
V
ar
0.
01
43
6
11
4.
68
0.
06
29
7
0.
00
49
6
0.
06
08
3
0.
12
62
1
0.
23
87
2
0.
22
22
2
0.
17
64
3
K
ur
to
si
s
-
0.
11
34
-
0.
57
31
-
0.
97
51
8.
9E
-0
5
1.
17
30
7
0.
72
01
5
-
1.
80
75
-
1.
49
08
-
0.
30
21
Sk
ew
ne
ss
0.
42
81
1
0.
63
24
4
0.
47
40
9
1.
03
70
5
-
1.
62
2
1.
58
11
3
-
0.
45
08
0.
71
97
4
1.
30
37
3
R
an
ge
0.
58
04
1
42
0.
84
71
6
0.
24
98
9
0.
82
88
1
1
1
1
1
M
in
im
um
0.
00
06
4
10
0.
15
28
4
0
-
0.
68
0
0
0
0
M
ax
im
um
0.
58
10
5
52
1
0.
24
98
9
0.
14
88
1
1
1
1
1
Su
m
72
.7
47
2
92
82
.7
3
19
4.
99
5
21
.2
67
-
28
.6
58
62
.7
61
5
20
6
11
2
77
Co
un
t
33
8
33
8
33
8
33
8
33
8
33
8
33
8
33
8
33
8
D
IS
P-
Ti
ck
et
pr
ic
e
di
sp
er
sio
n
D
IS
T-
D
is
ta
nc
e
H
ER
F-
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
n
N
O
N
ST
P-
N
on
-s
to
p
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
LO
CS
Tt
r-D
ire
ct
,l
ow
-c
o
st
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
A
LT
LO
CS
T-
In
di
re
ct
,l
ow
-c
o
st
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
H
U
B
-H
ub
do
m
in
an
ce
SL
O
T-
Ca
pa
ci
ty
co
n
tr
ol
le
d
ai
rp
or
t
VA
C-
Va
ca
tio
n
ro
u
te
equation explains 41 percent of the total ticket price variance(adjusted R2 =
0.413).
The standardized beta coefficients provide a measure of the relative
influence of each independent variable on ticket price dispersion. These
coefficients are -.36, .23, .18, and .14 for HERF, NONSTP, LOCSCTtr, and
SLOT, respectively, and show the route concentration has the greatest
explanatory power.
DISCUSSION
The inclusion in this research of market variables for low-cost carrier
and non-stop flight competition add insight and explanatory power to
Borenstein and Rose’s seminal study of airline ticket price dispersion.
Although Dresner et al. (1996) have demonstrated the powerful effect of
low cost carrier competition in lowering average ticket prices, the effect on
price dispersion had not been previously estimated. Likewise, the non-stop
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Table 3. Regression Results of Determinants of Price Dispersion in U.S. Airline
Markets, 1995
Multiple R .64733
R Square .41904
Adjusted R Square .41206
Standard Error .09189
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 4 2.02792 .50698
Residual 333 2.81155 .00844
F = 60.04655 Signif F = .0000
—————— Variables in the Equation ——————
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
HERF -.172539 .024749 -.361293 -6.972 .0000
NONSTP .390133 .075838 .229289 5.144 .0000
LOCSTtr .090745 .024936 .184272 3.639 .0003
SLOT .035049 .011042 .137872 3.174 .0016
(Constant) .286105 .016630 17.204 .0000
—————— Variables not in the Equation ——————
Variable Beta In Partial Min Toler T Sig T
DIST .028528 .025163 .451974 .459 .6468
ALTLOCST -.059301 -.074116 .649533 -1.354 .1766
HUB .026490 .031069 .573348 .566 .5715
VAC .046463 .059465 .623918 1.085 .2785
variable has not heretofore been included in the airline pricing literature.
Though the results generally confirm those of Borenstein and Rose, the
explanatory power of the regression equation is doubled.
Competition and Price Discrimination
Markets typically embody the ideals neither of perfect competition nor
of pure monopoly but are instead imperfectly competitive lying somewhere
between the two poles. Along this continuum, classic microeconomic
theory suggests that price discrimination decreases with increased
competition. Instead, the results confirm the theoretical work of Borenstein
(1985), Holmes (1989), and Gale (1993) and Borenstein and Rose’s (1994)
empirical findings that price dispersion under imperfect competition
increases with competition. In the research sample, the Herfindahl index of
route competition is the most robust indicator of price dispersion. Airlines
appear to respond to increased competition with aggressive passenger
segmentation and pricing. Although ground and in-flight amenities serve to
differentiate products, segmentation is primarily achieved with purchase
restrictions while seat inventory is dynamically controlled by yield
management systems. The theory and findings suggest a similar pattern
may be found in other service industries which practice some form of yield
management and may well generalize beyond the service industries.
Because the regression model does not include any measurements of
marginal cost, finding substantial and widespread ticket price dispersion
does not prove price discrimination. On the other hand, airline yield
management systems allocate seat inventory on the basis of forecast
demand without regard to cost. Price discrimination is, therefore, implied
by the existence of large price dispersion for a product with only minor
within-carrier attribute differences (the sample does not include tickets of
first class passengers).
Product Differentiation
The regression results show that the presence of low-cost carrier
competition and/or a combination of non-stop and connecting flights on a
route increase price dispersion. Since both these predictor variables are
product attributes, these results suggests that increased product
differentiation leads to increased route price dispersion. Although neither
variable was employed by Borenstein and Rose, the finding is intuitively
appealing—differentiated products should sell for differing prices.
The non-stop variable (NONSTP) is a parabolic function of non-stop
flight market share which peaks with an equal number of passengers
traveling on non-stop and connecting flights. Carriers offering non-stop
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service can apparently extract a premium for superior service. Although
airline marketers are certainly aware of this advantage, the premium pricing
flows directly from the operation of the yield management system.
The low-cost carrier variable (LOCSTtr) is also a parabolic function
which peaks at a 30 percent route market share for low-cost carriers. This
finding suggests traditional incumbent carriers can sustain a price premium
for the business passenger segment up to this market share. Given earlier
research showing that the presence of a low cost carrier substantially
reduces the average fare (Windle & Dresner, 1995; Dresner et al., 1996), at
low cost carrier market shares above 30 percent, this premium can no
longer be extracted and price dispersion and average fare both fall.
It is also interesting to note that price dispersion is low in monopoly
markets, many of which are controlled by preeminent low cost carrier
Southwest Airlines. At least as of the third quarter of 1995, Southwest did
not appear to practice yield management and, by extension, price
discrimination.
Production Constraints
Some proxy for airport capacity limits is generally used in airline
pricing studies. Not surprisingly, most studies show that these limits raise
average fares. The findings confirm those of Borenstein and Rose that
capacity constraints also increase route ticket price dispersion. This result
may hold in other settings as well provided that periods of lower demand
exist when production capacity is not a constraint. Flights are limited at
capacity constrained airports only at the peak demand times in the morning
and evening. At other times, airlines are relatively free to add flights. This
dynamic appears to result in higher fares at times of peak demand than
would be the case without production limitations. At other periods,
however, fares are competitive with non-constrained routes.
Insignificant Predictors
Hypothesized relationships with predictors variables for (a) vacation
routes, (b) competition from low cost carriers on directly competitive
routes, (c) hub airports, and (d) route distance proved not significant. Using
a somewhat more sensitive proxy for vacation routes, Borenstein and Rose
(1994) found that a concentration of leisure travelers decreased price
dispersion. Lack of confirmation of their result may be due to the
coarseness of the VAC variable based solely on a route endpoint being a
vacation destination. Price dispersion would be expected to increase with
heterogeneity of consumer demands; thus routes with either a high
concentration of business or leisure passengers should display low price
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dispersion. Some sort of parabolic function, similar in concept to the
NONSTP variable, would best capture the relationship.
Low cost carrier competition on a competing route had not previously
been tested. The insignificance of the variable suggests that traditional
carriers respond more aggressively to competition on the same route than
on a competing route. This result is somewhat surprising in light of Dresner
et al. (1996) finding that low cost carrier competition on competing routes
substantially lowers average fare.
Likewise, major carrier hub airport as an endpoint also proved
insignificant as a predictor of price dispersion. Previous studies have
consistently shown that average prices on tickets originating at hub airports
exceed those on comparable routes from non-hub originations. Borenstein
and Rose (1994) do not test directly for this effect; Hayes and Ross (1998)
report conflicting results, so no firm conclusion can be reached.
Finally, the square root of the route distance is insignificant. The DIST
variable, however, is highly correlated with the proportion of non-stop
flights on the route concentration (NONSTP) (p = .72). The collinearity
with the NONSTP variable renders distance insignificant.
CONCLUSION
This study should interest both scholars and practitioners. The results
support recent theoretical developments predicting an increase in price
discrimination as markets move from monopoly to limited competition.
Students of price determination may find these results generalize to other
industries. While the literature suggests a similar pattern of price dispersion
exists elsewhere, confirmation awaits future research. Immediate
candidates are other transportation industries such as trucking, railroads,
and shipping. Beyond the transportation industries, other service
industries, for example, entertainment and lodging, are beginning to use
yield management system and should prove interesting candidates for
pricing studies.
While airline marketers are certainly aware of the critical role of yield
management to profitability, the model adds to the understanding of price
variances across markets. It suggests that low cost carriers will encounter
significantly less competitive response from established incumbents by
targeting secondary airports in major markets. Finally, the airline history
and study results point to the substantial benefits accruing to companies
introducing or improving yield management in other service industries.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Low Cost Carrier Listing, 1995
1. Air South
2. Air Tran
3. American Trans Air
4. Carnival
5. Frontier
6. Kiwi
7. Mark Air
8. Midway
9. Morris Air
10. Reno Air
11. Southwest
12. Spirit
13. Sun Jet
14. Tower Air
15. ValuJet
Source: DOT, 1996; Dresner, Lin, & Windle, 1996
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STRATEGIC ALLIANCES OF AIRLINES
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne
Montreal, Canada
ABSTRACT
This article will examine the semantics of strategic airline alliances and the manner in which
such alliances overcome bureaucratic obstacles to gain access to open competition. The
conclusion will address the issue of aviation safety, which has been inextricably linked by
some to the proliferation of air transport activity envisioned in the near future.
INTRODUCTION
Today’s commercial competition has transcended the past era, where
dominant markets protected their established market shares. Most mega
commercial activity was then the purview of governmental control under
instrumentalities of State which were mostly cumbersome bureaucracies at
best. Perhaps the best analogy is the biggest commercial market—the
United States—which had, until recently, extensively regulated larger
commercial activities pertaining to energy, transportation and
telecommunications.
Happily, over the past decade, commercial air carriers have broken the
shackles of rigid regulation to form strategic alliances among themselves.
These alliances have been formed in the realization that the performance of
an airline can be affected by two factors: the average performance of all
competitors in the airline industry; and whether the airline concerned is a
superior or inferior performer in the industry. Michael Porter1 encapsulates
these two factors in the single premise that any business achieves superior
profitability in its industry by attaining either higher prices or lower costs
than rivals. Curiously, in the airline industry, it is the latter—lower costs—
which has been the cornerstone of strategic alliances.
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The reason for airlines banding together is to share an otherwise wasted
market which is still regulated by bilateral governmental negotiations. This
unfortunate state of affairs has been brought about by a lacuna in the
Convention of International Civil Aviation2 (Chicago Convention) which
leaves the absolute prerogative of allowing air carriers to carry passengers,
cargo and mail into and out of their territories to States.3 This privilege has
encouraged the protective instincts of States to ensure that their national
carriers obtain optimum market share belonging to them, based on a now
antiquated belief that all passengers, cargo and mail destined to a particular
State or leaving that State, is the birth right of the national carrier of that
State. This stifling phenomenon has encouraged airlines to think more
strategically over the past two decades, resulting in the pursuit of improved
operational effectiveness in their activities.
The seminal response of most strategic airlines to the interference of
governments was to share each others’ resources, including air traffic
rights, thus gaining access to what was disallowed under bilateral
governmental agreement. Recently, airlines have become more aware than
ever that they are becoming an increasingly capital intensive industry and
have a compelling need to reduce costs in order to survive. The end result
has been an array of commercial arrangements between airlines—from
statements of common interests to block space arrangements, code sharing
and coordination of frequent flyer programmes—to name just a few.4
This article will examine the semantics of strategic airline alliances and
the manner in which such alliances overcome bureaucratic obstacles to gain
access to open competition. The conclusion will address the issue of
aviation safety, which has been inextricably linked by some to the
proliferation of air transport activity envisioned in the near future.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Arguably, the most spectacular strategic airline alliance so far is the
“Star” Alliance, which was launched in 1997 by Lufthansa, SAS, United
Airlines, Thai Airways International and Air Canada. Brazilian carrier
Varig joined later, and it is expected that Ansett Australia and Air New
Zealand would join the alliance in 1999. Recently, Singapore Airlines
signed a commercial agreement with SAS—one of the “Star” Alliance
members—which will bring Singapore Airlines inextricably close to the
alliance itself.5 It is evident that the carriers of North America, Europe and
the Asia Pacific regions, which form the Star Alliance have skillfully
maneuvered their dominance of the regions they represent. The direction in
which the alliance is heading, with the possible future membership of
Japan’s All Nippon Airways (ANA), is incontrovertibly to assert its
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presence in the burgeoning Asia Pacific market, in particular the Pacific
Region.
The underlying philosophy of the airline alliances, typified by a “Star”
Alliance, is not so much an emphasis on the more effective use of resources
such as labour, capital and national resources (which are inevitably
important factors) but rather an overall reliance on the strategy of location,
where the sharing of locations represented by the various airlines have
enabled them to produce their goods and services in a consistent manner,
thus achieving the status equivalent to a cartel, while still retaining their
individual identities.
Airlines have developed both a corporate strategy and a competition
strategy to cope with competition. Both these strategies are becoming
increasingly complementary rather than being mutually exclusive, which
they were at the inception of airline competition 50 years ago. As airlines
began to compete with each other across the borders, they acquired the
ability to locate themselves overseas—creating a compelling need for
commercial airlines to be fully acquainted with locational strategy and
competitive advantages of various locations. Very early in the game, giants
such as Pan Am and TWA began to realize that even the strongest company
with an established position in the airline industry unthreatened by
competition from new entrants or smaller airlines, would start losing
business if they faced a better or lower cost product. The threat of new
entrants, the bargaining power of supplies and customers and the superior
quality or low cost of substitute products were arguably the underlying
reasons for established airlines to begin experiencing a downturn in the
sixties, which was exacerbated through the seventies and eighties. These
threats could not be effectively circumvented or overcome by the
established carriers, partly because of the sustained circumscription of
market entry imposed by Article 6 of the Chicago Convention.
The genesis of airline alliances therefore was a contrived symbiosis or
coexistence between the new entrants or new competitors—who had the
clout of resources but not the dimensions of a larger carrier—and the larger
carrier itself who had an established product to offer. Together, these two
types of carriers could eradicate such obstacles as product differentiation
(which was a distinct disadvantage to carriers which did not have an
established brand); capital requirements (which again was a disadvantage
faced by a smaller carrier); economies of scale (which forced a smaller
carrier to compete on a large scale); and government policy (which affected
both types of carriers—particularly the larger carrier which had the
resources to operate air services but not the market access to a given
region).
Abeyratne 57
Another type of commercial alliance is the mega alliance referred to
earlier in analogy typified by the Star Alliance. The precursor to this type of
alliance could have been the modest pool agreement between two carriers
operating third and fourth freedom traffic, that is, traffic purely originating
and ending in each others’ territories. The pool agreement was written into
a bilateral air services agreement between two States in order to ensure
equal enjoyment of market share between their carriers in the route
between their States’ territories. This notion gave rise to an extension of the
principle of pooling, which was to share locational traffic on a fifth
freedom, that is, traffic which is picked up at intermediate or beyond points
on services between two States, and, more importantly, sixth freedom—
traffic to which a carrier had no right but could operate under the air traffic
rights of another carrier, through a commercial arrangement such as a code
share agreement signed by and between the carriers.
SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Airline alliances, particularly code sharing agreements, add destinations
to a route network and offer more frequencies of service to customers. With
such arrangements, an airline can add on flights using its code sharing
partners flight entitlement and operate to additional destinations without
adding any resources. Of course, such an arrangement would create a
duopoly, depriving customers of the benefit of competition, pricing, etc., if
the airlines concerned were in competition on a given route. Code sharing
not only affects passenger traffic, but influences the consolidation of cargo
carriage as well, as was seen in the Swissair-Delta Airlines cargo alliance
across the Atlantic.6
In Europe, the open skies concept, introduced by the European Union as
legislator, in 1977, was meant to open competition between European
carriers in Europe in order to offer competitive airline services to
customers. However, this has not had the desired effect, owing largely to
airlines forming alliances under the umbrella of the open skies legislation.
In particular, the four alliances, headed by British Airways, Lufthansa,
KLM and Swissair, have vigorously entered into alliances with smaller
carriers under franchising agreements in order to gain access to markets
they have not obtained in their air services agreements.
There are approximately 1,200 scheduled air carriers in the world. It is
estimated that there are approximately 10,000 aircraft in the air at any given
moment. Excluding China and the countries of the former Soviet Union,
approximately 380,000 civil aircraft are registered in International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) States. Of these, 45,000 are used by
commercial operators.7 Forecasts of the number of passengers carried on
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scheduled services in nine intercontinental route groups show the
transpacific and Europe-Asia markets as the fastest growing, at 8 percent
and 7.5 percent per annum, respectively, for the forecast period through to
the year 2003.8 International scheduled passenger traffic is forecast to grow
at an average rate of 6.5 percent per annum compared with 4 percent per
annum for domestic traffic.9 These rapidly evolving trends will no doubt be
accommodated by equally rapidly developing technology and economic
norms of the airline industry. Incontrovertibly, code sharing and computer
reservation systems (CRS) are at the helm of this process.
Although technically, code sharing and functions of computer
reservations systems are two different activities of the air transport
industry, they become inextricably linked to each other when two air
carriers who share each others’ codes may wish to have their shared flights
displayed in each of their CRS. The placement of a code-shared flight in
one CRS of a code sharing partner, differently from the system of the other,
would make no commercial sense both to the air carrier concerned and the
consumer. Thus, multiple listings of the same flight may appear in CRS and
airline schedules, often misleading the potential passenger, but certainly
drawing an identifiable link between the two systems. Both activities,
therefore, which have undergone a significant exponential growth over the
past few years, warrant a close analysis in view of their inextricable link to
each other and joint quest for commercial credibility and consistency. An
inexorable implication of this symbiosis is the impact the two activities
may bring to bear on the principles of the law of contract. This paper will
discuss code sharing and CRS against the backdrop of contractual liability
principles of air carriers and CRS users obtaining at international law and
common law jurisdictions as they relate to the carriage by air of persons.
Code Sharing
Code sharing between two airlines is essentially two different airlines
posing as one, sharing or rotating aircraft crew and responsibility.10 It has
been called a little more than a glorified interline agreement which occurs
when one airline operates a flight but both its and another carrier’s codes
are used.11 Thus, for example, a passenger who contracts with airline A to
travel from Canada to Australia may find himself in the same aircraft with a
passenger who contracted with airline B for the same journey.
The United States Department of Transportation (DoT) uses a
somewhat technical definition for code sharing which it calls, “…a
common airline industry marketing practice where, by mutual agreement
between cooperating carriers, at least one of the airline designator codes
used on a flight is different from that of the airline operating the flight.”12
The DoT then classifies code sharing under this definitive structure into
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two types: the first being the typical international airline operation where
two or more airlines each use their own designator codes on the same
aircraft operation; and, the second enunciating the domestic code shared
flight where the code on the passenger’s ticket is not that of the operator of
the flight, but where the operator does not offer the service in his own name.
DoT goes on to bifurcate international code sharing, where, in the first
category, only one segment of the journey—which usually involves a
connection—operates under two different codes, one used by an airline for
its local traffic, and the other used by its partner for the entire journey, and
in the second, the entire journey is advertised and displayed under the codes
of the two airlines which share the flight concerned.13
The marketing benefits of code sharing have been identified as the
ability of airlines to: coordinate schedules; transfer baggage easily;
maintain common marketing activity by the sharing air carriers; use
through fares; use single check-ins; share airport lounges; share frequent
flyer programmes; and, agree upon exactly which airline is legally
responsible for the passenger’s whole journey by air. American Airlines,
one of the early proponents and participants in the code-sharing concept,
adds the safeguarding of traffic rights to this list, where it is claimed that a
stronger carrier in the market could be forced to code share with a weaker
national carrier, thus spreading commercial benefits on a given route
among two carriers equitably.
One of the most scathing attacks on code sharing is that it seeks to create
the illusion that interline connections between code sharing partners are the
equivalent of on-line connections, which is not so. It is claimed that this
alleged illusion is successfully carried out because passengers prefer on-
line to interline connections by a ratio of approximately four to one, fooling
them to believing that a code-share is an on-line service. Robert Crandall,
Chairman, American Airlines, is of the view that allowing foreign carriers
to deceive consumers into believing that a domestic code-shared service is
really an extension of an international service of a foreign carrier,
effectively precludes genuine carriers from building strong, dependable on-
line services.14 Crandall also believes that code sharing is an anti-
consumer marketing activity in that it causes multiple listings of the same
flights in computer reservations systems and printed multi-airline
schedules, thus debasing the quality of the information available to
consumers.15
Code sharing really gathered momentum with the introduction of
computer reservations systems. Major United States airlines found it
attractive to engage in code sharing in relation to CRS as it provided them a
better exposure on the CRS screen. Although a code shared flights may not
yet appear on a computer screen in its pristine form to be identified as such,
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code shared flights now appear in CRS as on-line connections and are thus
given priority over interline connections, giving them an overall higher
profile in the CRS and making them more likely prospects for booking by a
travel agent.16 These code-shared flights which appear as connections with
aircraft change on the screen would enable such flights to appear at least
four times on the same screen. Some countries therefore view code shared
agreements as efficacious marketing tools and dissociate the concept
entirely from the issue of traffic rights.
In January 1995, United States’ Secretary of State for Transportation,
Fedrico Pena announced the International Aviation Policy Statement of the
United States which primarily endorsed code sharing as a cost efficient way
for carriers to enter new markets and expand their systems.17 Earlier, in
December 1994, the U.S. Department of Transport had released its report
on international code sharing which it had commissioned from Gellman
Research Associates.18 Secretary of State Fedrico Pena referred to the
study as follows:
This study fully supports the department’s international aviation policy
statement. It demonstrates that the movement towards globalization and
transnational alliances through code sharing and liberalized bilateral
arrangements delivers benefits not only for United States consumers but for
the United States airline industry as well.19
One of the issues that emerged from the study was that the critical factor
in code sharing is not whether it is good or bad, but whether it has certain
undesirable effects that need to be addressed by policy makers. Based on an
econometric consumer choice model that was applied to certain code
sharing agreements, as against non-code shared flights, the study concludes
that the negative impact on consumers as a result of potential deception is
inconsequential as any impact of such misleading practices would be
cushioned by existing DoT safety nets. The GRA study’s findings were also
consistent with the overall DoT perception that all international traffic will
ultimately be restructured into long haul services linking inter continental
hubs, with intra regional spokes feeding traffic—leading to the
proliferation of airlines and the expansion of code sharing.20
The study concluded that benefits to consumers, estimated at $37.4
million were minuscule compared to approximately $10 billion that
passengers spend each year on transatlantic tickets. Even if one were to
assume, as the study suggests, that the number should be doubled, a gain of
around $75 million was comparatively inconsequential. Another
conclusion was that consumer benefits of code sharing was not so much
quantifiable in fiscal terms but rather in terms of higher convenience,
higher quality of airline service, and time savings generated through the
faster elapsed time offered by code shared flights.
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Computer Reservation Systems (CRS)
Airline computer reservation systems is one of the most rapidly
developing industries today. This development is being driven in part by the
enormous strides made by industrial technology. Traditionally, airlines
have been at the helm of computer usage and their sustained use goes back
30 years. In the sixties, the airlines inaugurated high speed real-time
reservations systems, and today, these systems use some of the most
sophisticated computer software in the world. CRS, which began as a
simple means of placing an order for a seat on a plane, has now developed
to add various new dimensions to the carriage of persons and goods from
one point to another by air—such as hotel reservations, car rentals
authorization of credit facilities to customers and theatre reservations—all
of which cumulatively make CRS an effective marketing tool.
Inevitably, from progress and development emerges the immutable fact
that while some may benefit from the whole process of development, others
may feel left behind, even to the extent of being run out of business. One of
the corollaries to the phenomenal growth and development of the CRS
process is the plight of airlines and travel agents who do not have the ability
to participate actively in sophisticated and widespread CRS programmes.
A travel agent usually gains access to a CRS through a terminal
consisting of a key board and a visual display unit. The first step is usually
to enter the key data—such as the departure and arrival points relating to an
air journey. The system then responds by reflecting on the screen various
flight options called upon by the system according to the requested data and
time of travel and adjusted according to the priority criteria used in the
reservations system concerned. Although CRS have the capacity to list all
possible flight options between city pairs concerned, they usually display
merely a small number of options, necessitating a search for others. In view
of pressures brought upon time and other resource constraints, the tendency
is usually to settle for what is displayed on the screen. Needless to say, this
process effectively precludes those options offered by airlines enjoying less
priority than others from being made known to the prospective airline
customer.21
The importance of code sharing in this process becomes all the more
significant, since, a flight jointly served by two airlines who share each
other’s codes would have the leverage of both those airlines in the CRS to
be displayed more prominently than a flight which is served by a single
carrier. In other words, it is claimed that code sharing by airlines may ipso
facto aggravate any imbalance that may already exist in the CRS in favour
of those airlines which are prioritized in the systems for other commercial
reasons. Barry Humphreys observes: “The exclusion of an airline’s services
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or the failure to show its correct fares or seat availability status can have a
disastrous effect on its ability to compete effectively, and numerous cases
have been documented to show that these are not merely hypothetical
examples of anti-competitive behaviour.”22
Franchising
One of the more recent marketing initiatives to emerge in the airline
industry is franchising. In its contemporary business garb, franchising has
permeated a wide spectrum of businesses, introducing a sophisticated
business relationship between two parties, thereby creating a contractual
relationship. The franchisor, who develops a unique and individual way of
conducting business, permits the franchisee to make use of the franchisor’s
business name and use his business methods in the franchisee’s business,
subject to controls imposed by the franchisor.
The application of the principles of franchising fits in well with the
modern exigencies of airline business, where the personality developed and
projected by a highly successful airline has become of increasing
importance to passengers, thus making an airline’s image a marketable
quantity. Some major airlines have indeed capitalized on this commercial
possibility by developing much vaunted and attractive consumer based
brand personalities and using them as key marketing tools towards
attracting potential franchisees from whom they derive independent
income by selling their names and business methods.
A fundamental advantage offered by franchising is the attraction for
airlines to allow them to protect and extend their brand to routes (which are
otherwise commercially unviable) without actually operating air services
to such routes. This is done by getting a franchisee to operate on such routes
while using the name and livery of the franchisor, whereby the latter
skillfully avoids the risk of capital investment but still derives income in the
shelter of a franchise agreement.
A notable example of franchising in the airline business can be seen in
Europe in British Airways which had six franchising agreements in the year
ending March 1996.23 The six franchisees, most of whom operated under
the name British Airways Express (with the exception of two who operated
under the name British Airways) carried in 1996 a combined capacity of
3.4 million passengers to 80 destinations. The franchisees paid British
Airways a fixed fee for the use of services they were obliged to use—such
as reservations systems—and a fixed royalty for the use of the brand of the
airline.24 The franchisees could also offer their passengers air miles on
British Airways in the latter’s frequent flyer scheme.
Extending its franchising agreements to international operations outside
of Europe, British Airways has also signed an agreement with Comair of
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South Africa, which has been obliged under the franchise provisions in the
agreement to repaint its livery in British Airways’ livery, outfit its cabin and
customer service staff in British Airways uniforms who would offer a
typical British Airways in-flight service on Comair’s franchised flights. In
addition, Comair agreed to transfer its reservations systems to British
Airways’ systems and offer its passengers membership in the British
Airways frequent flyer programme.25
The other large British carrier, Virgin Atlantic, has also been reported to
consider the extension of its short haul franchise operations to longer
routes. In 1994, Virgin Atlantic was operating two extremely profitable
franchised flights between London and Athens and London and Dublin
respectively, where the two routes were operated by independent carriers
which used the Virgin brand name and livery on their aircraft.26
Another significant example of franchising agreements in the airline
business is the one signed by Air France and BritAir—when BritAir placed
its entire staff and 23 aircraft under the brand name of Air France27—in
exchange for Air France granting a dozen of its routes to BritAir which
operated 150 daily flights on these routes. Encouraged by the commercial
efficacy and profitability of this agreement, Air France has been seeking
additional franchising accords with smaller airlines in order to maximize
the passenger flow into its hub at Roissy Charles de Gaulle Airport in
Paris.28
In October 1996, Lufthansa entered into a unique franchising agreement
with Augsburg Airways, forming a partnership named Team Lufthansa
whereby Augsburg Airways operated, at its own cost, three German
domestic routes with Lufthansa flight numbers and under quality control by
Lufthansa.29
One of the compelling reasons for franchising to emerge as a marketing
tool in the airline industry, particularly in Europe, is the European air travel
market’s polarization between scheduled and unscheduled (charter
carriers). European charter carriers have grown prolifically in the last two
decades as a backlash to increasingly high scheduled fares. In 1996 it was
reported that in the United Kingdom alone, 14 million persons used charter
flights on their vacation.30 The growing disparity between the fares of
scheduled carriers and the low package fares offered by charter carriers
have released in Europe the franchisee—hybrid carriers in the form of a
compromise between scheduled and unscheduled carriage—where a small
airline can offer competitive fares under the ever important brand name of a
large, prestigious carrier. The franchised flight therefore offers the
traveling public a via media—of a comparatively low fare for a customized
flight under the brand name of a large carrier.
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The major concern caused by franchising is that major airlines use the
services of smaller airlines to carry out franchise services by using a mix of
franchise-code share agreements in order to obviate the necessity for
operating on revenue losing routes themselves, while retaining their
presence on these routes through the franchisees’ operations. The European
Union has claimed that, by using franchising agreements in the above
manner, major airlines have retained their unprofitable routes and also the
valuable slots that go with such operations.31
Franchising, which as frequently been described as “one of the greatest
inventions of western capitalism…”32 [and the] “…dominating force in the
distribution of goods and services”33 is perhaps best described as the only
form of business organization, which, by its very nature, creates business
units providing new entrepreneurs, new jobs, new services and new export
opportunities.34 The symbiotic relationship forged between the franchisor
and the franchisee blends harmoniously to form a mutually convenient
commercial arrangement between the parties: “Franchising has provided
the means for merging the seemingly conflicting interests of existing
businesses with those of aspiring entrepreneurs in a single process that
promotes business expansion, entrepreneurial opportunity and shared cost
and risk.”35 Be that as it may, one of the most serious shortcomings of the
commercial relationship established by the franchise contract is the oft-
experienced imbalance in the power between the franchisor and the
franchisee in favour of the former, and the lack of information exchange
between the parties to the contract. These factors have given rise to the
suggestion that the traditional freedom of contract principles which obtain
at common law be modified to accommodate the franchise phenomenon.
This call for modification of contract law principles to accord with the
synergic relationship created by a franchise agreement is primarily based
on the concern that the time and money invested by a franchisee in the
promotion of the franchisor’s trade name and trade marks can be
jeopardized, and even forfeited by, the arbitrary action of the franchisor.36
In the context of franchise agreements between airlines, the personality
of the franchisor, who lends his goodwill to the franchisee, plays a key role.
The traditional view that goodwill is retained by, and belongs to, the
franchisor also applies in the commercial aviation context where the
franchisee simply acquires a right to participate in a business system for a
term and in a manner prescribed by the franchise agreement. The
franchisee usually does not retain a right to assign the franchise to a third
party; have the agreement reviewed on termination; or demand
compensation upon non-renewal of the contract. However, there have been
instances, particularly in the United States, where courts have been
favourable towards protecting a franchisee’s investment from forfeiture
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through the arbitrary and capricious action of a franchisor.37
The observation of Lord McNaughten in 1901 about goodwill, that it is a
thing very easy to describe, but very difficult to define,38 applies even today
to the personality of an airline which is franchised.
The goodwill which is traded in a franchise agreement is essentially the
benefit and advantage derived from the use of a good name, reputation and
connections of a business. Goodwill or personality of an airline is the one
attractive force that brings in customers and clientele. In the same case
Lord Lindley added that goodwill includes: “Whatever adds value to a
business by reason of situation, name and reputation, connection,
introduction to old customers and agreed absence of competition, or any of
these things, and there may be others which do not occur to me.”39 One of
the salient features of a franchise agreement is that goodwill or personality,
which is the pivotal ingredient and the main attraction which draws in
money to the franchisor, does not act to the benefit of the franchisee at the
termination or non renewal of a franchise agreement. In other words, the
franchisee airline cannot claim compensation from the franchisor for
goodwill accrued to the latter during the period of the franchise agreement
due to the operation of services by the franchisee. This traditional view was
confirmed in the 1989 Australian case of Kanoa Ply Ltd. V. BP Oil
Distribution Ltd.40 Where the Court held that an oil company franchisee
had no right of compensation for good will lost when a service station lease
and dealer trading agreement were not renewed. It was the Court’s view
that on expiry of the Statutory tenure there was no further obligation to
renew the contract and no requirement to pay compensation in respect of
goodwill acquired by the oil company through non renewal of the franchise
agreement. Lockhart, Wilcox and Grammon JJ held:
Under the general law, in the absence of any special covenant and any other
applicable statute, upon the tenancy of the appellant coming to an end, the
benefit of any goodwill of the character described above would ensure to the
benefit of the first respondent as lessor… Where a franchisor elects to grant a
new lease the franchisee has the benefit of continued exploitation of the
goodwill of the site… But where a franchisor elects not to grant a new lease,
the franchisee is turned from the site without compensation for any goodwill
which it may have developed during its period of occupancy. A franchisee,
such as the appellant, may regard this result as harsh, the harshness being
exacerbated if it should be the case-we do not know whether it is so-that
franchisors are more likely to decide themselves to operate sites to which
substantial goodwill attaches. But if this result is harsh, it is a product of the
circumstance that the law does not require the franchisor who elects not to
renew to pay any compensation to the franchisee.41
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CONCLUSION
Strategic alliances of the airline industry is but a natural corollary to the
exponential growth of international air transport as an industry. The
concept itself is based on the theory that with rapid demand for air
transport, requiring a doubling of the 16,000 world aircraft fleet by the year
2015, these would be a compelling need for new connections between
points and more frequencies to serve these connections. There is no
stopping this trend, which has already swept the aviation industry. There is,
however, one point of caution. The fundamental postulate of air transport
has been, and remains to be, safety of passengers. The proliferation of
aircraft in the skies may challenge airline safety, if parallel measures are not
set in motion to ensure the safe passage of the thousands of aircraft in the
sky.
In 1997, the total scheduled international flights operated by the 705
carriers of the 185 Contracting States of ICAO carried a total of
approximately 1,448 million passengers and 26 million tonnes of freight. In
the same year, there were an estimated 16,993 operational aircraft (each
carrying more than a maximum take off weight of 9,000 kg), which was a
59 percent increase from 10,712 aircraft operating a decade ago. Also, in
1997, 1,309 jet aircraft were ordered (as against 1,003 in 1996) and 674
were delivered in the same year.
If this were not sufficient to reflect the gigantic proportions to which
international air transport has grown, more daunting figures loom ahead.
For instance, it is estimated that the worldwide jet transport fleet will
double through 2015. With the current aircraft accident rate at 1.76
accidents per million departures—which is the safest statistical record of
accident rates in all modes of transportation—there are aggressive calls to
reduce this rate by half, to 0.88 accidents per million departures by the year
2015. Moreover, the Gore Commission of the United States has bettered
this figure by calling for an 80 percent reduction in fatal aircraft accidents.
In 1995, 19 Western built jet aircraft were totally destroyed in air
crashes, which killed 383 passengers and 39 crew members.42 Although
this rate of loss has been steady for the past 10 years, there were three major
losses in 1996—the famous Valujet and TWA aircraft in the United States
and the world’s worst midair collision in history new New Delhi, India,
where a Saudia Boeing 747 with 312 persons aboard collided with a Kazak
aircraft carrying 37 passengers and crew. All on board were killed. More
recently, in early 1998, the loss of a Swissair MD 11 aircraft off the coast of
Nova Scotia in Canada reiterated with monotonous regularity the enormity
of the problem posed to aviation safety and brought to bear the compelling
need for the international community to continue to take energetic and
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vigilant measures to curb the problem, if not totally eradicate it.
International dimensions of aviation safety are all encompassing, and are
not limited to attacks on aircraft but include the management of airspace in
order to prevent accidents caused by inadequate air navigation systems or
human error. It is therefore prudent to address aviation safety within all its
parameters, particularly in the context of the crowding of airspace brought
about by the proliferation of aircraft movements.
In order to address the issue of aviation safety, the Council of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) convened in Montreal,
from 10 to 12 November 1997, an international conference for Directors
General of Civil Aviation to review the ICAO Safety Oversight Programme
and to consider its expansion.43 Almost simultaneous with this event, ICAO
released its preliminary accident and security statistics for 1996, which
reflect that scheduled air carriers from the 185 ICAO Contracting States
reported 23 fatal aircraft accidents in 1996, compared with 26 in the
previous year.44 Although the incident rate declined in 1996, the number of
passenger deaths reported rose dramatically in 1996 to 1,135, compared
with 710 in 1995.
The Conference concluded inter alia that ICAO should continue to fulfil
its leading role with a view to making the safety oversight programme more
assertive and effective; that there should be a harmonized approach in
conducting safety audits; and that the ICAO safety oversight programme
should be expanded to other technical fields at the appropriate time,
initially to include air traffic services, aerodromes, support facilities and
services45.
Although the above figures portend a certain perceived gloom, the silver
lining comes with the awareness of the enormity of the problem and
identification of contributory factors to the aircraft accident rate. These
factors include: underdeveloped aviation infrastructure; poor airline
operating practices; inadequate national aviation oversight at varying
degrees; poor air traffic control capability; lack of navigational aids and
radar coverage; and substandard airport equipment. Unsatisfactory
meteorological facilities have also been identified as possible causes of
aircraft accidents.
For its part ICAO, through its Air Navigation Commission, completed
within the period from 1995 to 1998 the development of a framework
which encapsulates the seminal ICAO activities in pursuit of aviation
safety. The Commission created a comprehensive document which
encompassed a Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) which aims at giving
ICAO leadership to gain a commitment from States and the industry to
enhance aviation safety worldwide.
68 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
Safety is the primary concern of the world aviation community at the
present time. It is not only because the fundamental postulates of the
Chicago Convention of 194446 call for the safe and orderly development of
international civil aviation47 and mandate ICAO to insure the safe and
orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world48 but
also because the aviation world faces a critical era where, in the words of
Dr. Assad Kotaite, President of the ICAO Council: “…the international
aviation community cannot afford to relax its vigilance…ICAO would
continue to take timely action to ensure safety and security standards are in
effect, and that deficiencies are properly and efficiently addressed.”49
The compelling need for higher standards in aviation safety was
formally recognized when the ICAO Council adopted ICAO’s Strategic
Action Plan on 7 February 1997. The basic strategic objective of the Plan is
to further the safety, security and efficiency of international civil aviation.
ICAO plans to accomplish this task by assisting States in identifying
deficiencies in the implementation of Annexes to the Chicago Convention,
in particular these words contain provisions which ensure safety in
aviation.
One of the core elements of ICAO activity on safety, according to its
Strategic Action Plan, is to carry out assessments by teams of experts of the
capacity of participating States to control effectively the level of safety for
which they have responsibility—ICAO’s safety oversight programme,
which would implement this activity, extends to personnel licensing,
operation of aircraft and aircraft airworthiness. ICAO may, in the
foreseeable future, extend ICAO’s Safety Oversight Programme to cover
areas such as air traffic control and the operation of airports.
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ABSTRACT
For an airline, analyzing and forecasting air travel market is a part of its corporate planning
process. This paper addresses the determinants of domestic air travel demand in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. Here an attempt is made to develop models for domestic air travel demand in
the Kingdom with different combinations of explanatory variables utilizing stepwise
regression technique. The model, which has the total expenditures and population size as the
explanatory variables, is the most appropriate model to represent the demand for domestic air
travel in the Kingdom. The rest of the models discussed suffer from multicollinearity. The
model selected may be used to identify and measure the relations between domestic air travel
demand and the economic and demographic forces in the Kingdom.
INTRODUCTION
Air traffic forecast is one of the major inputs for fleet planning, route
development and preparation of the annual operating plan. Analyzing and
forecasting air travel demand help reduce the airlines’ risk by objectively
evaluating the demand side of the air transport business. Forecasting of
traffic should not be considered purely as rigid lines on charts that dictate
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airline’s future. Instead, it should be used dynamically to help an airline to
evaluate strategies (BCAC, 1993).
Several different methods are appropriate, ranging from time series
techniques to econometric modeling, for analyzing and forecasting the air
travel market. Time series approaches are the most common methods for
forecasting the traffic demand. These methods are handicapped by their
inability to identify the causes of market growth and to link the future
growth with expected developments of causative factors. They cannot, for
example, assess the impact of a reduction in fares, the introduction of new
aircraft, an economic recession, or the uncertainties with regard to future
regulatory conditions. Such questions can only be answered if the
forecaster has specified and calibrated a formal model that shows the
influence and interaction of all the relevant variables and not just one
variable (i.e., time). The time series approach assumes that the traffic
demand has behaved according to a specific pattern in the past and this
pattern will continue in the future. While weekly, daily, and hourly
variations can most easily be produced by using time series models,
econometric models are more appropriate for long-range forecasting
(Howard, 1974).
Because of the complex nature of the air transportation industry with
continuous changes in the environment, the past records of air traffic
forecasters (using mostly trend extrapolation) have not been impressive. In
recent years, therefore, the trend has been to develop causal models that not
only predict air traffic but also determine the impact of changes within the
economic and operating environment on air traffic. This paper aims at
developing econometric models that link future growth in domestic air
travel demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with expected
developments of causative factors.
The remainder of this paper reviews other studies on the air travel
demand and highlights the sources of data. Domestic air travel in the
Kingdom is described next followed by a discussion of the determinants of
air travel demand in Saudi Arabia, the presentation of the model, and
analysis of the empirical results. Some policy observations are also
included in the conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW ON AIR TRAVEL DEMAND
During the last three decades, large scale studies have examined various
aspects of analyzing and forecasting air travel demand (Alperovich and
Machnes, 1994; Poore, 1993; Ghobrial, 1992; Saudi Arabian Bechtel
Company, 1979; Abed, Bafail, and Jasimuddin, 1998).
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The study of Alperovich, and Machnes (1994) increased the
understanding of multiple dimensions of air travel. The principal findings
of their analysis are that (1) air travel to all foreign destinations is highly
elastic in income and inelastic in price and (2) there is no difference in
demand elasticity between financial and non-financial assets and that both
are inelastic.
Poore (1993) attempts to test the hypothesis that forecasts of the future
demand for air transportation offered by airplane manufacturers and
aviation regulators are reasonable and representative of the trends implicit
in actual experience. The tests compared forecasts provided by Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas, Airbus Industry and the International Civil Aviation
Organization, with actual results of a baseline model of the demand for
Revenue Passenger Kilometers (RPKs). The model is a combination of two
equations describing RPKs demanded by the high- and the low-income
groups respectively. Variations in RPKs demanded by the high-income
group are related to changes in income per capita. Variations in RPKs
demanded by the low-income segment are related to changes in population
size. The model conforms to the assumptions and conditions for
appropriate use of regression analysis.
Another study, conducted by Ghobrial (1992), presents an econometric
model that estimates the aggregate demand for an airline. The demand is
expressed in terms of airline network structure, operating characteristics
and firm-specific variables. Model formulations with various combinations
of explanatory variables are estimated using a two-stage least-square
procedure. The results indicate that ‘airline aggregate demand’ is elastic
with respect to yield, and inelastic with respect to network size and hub
dominance.
Saudi Arabian Bechtel Company (1979) conducted a study to update
traffic forecasts and planning assumptions for New International Airport at
Riyadh. Four economic variables related to air traffic activities, namely,
gross domestic product, government appropriations, project appropriations
and import of goods and services were chosen for the study. Each variable
was correlated with annual domestic and international passengers at the old
Riyadh Airport. In case of international passengers, the correlation
coefficient varies between 0.970 and 0.993 and the best results were
obtained with the imports cost, insurance & freight (C.I.F). For domestic
passengers, the correlation coefficient varies between 0.936 and 0.997 and
the best results were obtained with government appropriations.
Abed, Bafail and Jasimuddin (1998) developed several models for
analyzing and forecasting the long-term demand for international air travel
demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with different combinations of
explanatory variables using stepwise regression technique. They
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recommended a model, which has the total expenditures and population
size for the explanatory variables, as the most appropriate model to
represent the demand for international air travel in the Kingdom.
The literature review indicates that few studies refer to determinants of
the travel demand. There is no study on the determinants of air travel
demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This paper aims at developing
models to analyze and forecast the long-term demand for the air travel in
the Kingdom by exploring the determinants of domestic air travel demand.
DATA SOURCES
Since the econometric model is an invaluable tool for increasing the
understanding of the way an economic system works and for testing and
evaluating alternative policies, it is preferred for developing macro traffic
forecasts for air travel in the Kingdom. However, the most sophisticated
forecasting tools are useless if they operate on poor quality historical data
or faulty knowledge of the causative factors underlying traffic growth and
airline market share (BCC, 1987).
The availability of a consistent data set allows the use of annual data for
the period 1971 to 1994. The data used in the estimation of the model
originate from a variety of sources. Economic and demographic data of the
Kingdom have been taken from various issues of Achievements of the
development plans published by Ministry of Planning (Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 1992); data on GDP, GDP growth rates, real effective exchange
rates, imports and interest rates are from the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994; and data on Saudi air
travel are from PCA Statistical Yearbooks published by Presidency of Civil
Aviation, 1970 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1992). When interpreting
economic data it is important to distinguish between the effects of inflation
and changes in the real level of economic activity. To convert collected data
from the current prices to real or constant prices, consumer price index at
1988 constant prices was used.
FACTORS THAT AFFECT DOMESTIC AIR TRAVEL
MARKET IN SAUDI ARABIA
Fortunately the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is endowed with numerous
natural opportunities for air travel because of its geographical location,
being the site of the two holy mosques, its vast land area spreading from
Showrorah in the south to Tabuk in the north, its rapid development in all
spheres of life and its friendly relations with the world community. The
Kingdom has a strong base for air travel (Siddiqui, 1994). The Kingdom is
among the top 10 exporting and importing countries and among the top 20
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tourism business generating countries.
Air transportation in Saudi Arabia has also undergone considerable
expansions and developments. There are 25 international and domestic
airports in the Kingdom. The number of passengers (arriving and
departing) handled by all airports in the Kingdom has increased at an
average annual rate of 15 percent, rising from 1.6 million in 1970 to 33.0
million in 1994 (Ministry of Planning, 1992; 1991; 1970). Table 1 shows
the total number of passenger movements on domestic flights in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 1971 to 1994. The high air traffic growth
rate percentage between 1971 and 1994 may reflect growth in Saudi
economy in this period.
Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) has a monopoly in the domestic air
transportation market of the Kingdom. Over the past years Saudia has
coped with the needs of air travel and played a vital role in the development
of the Kingdom. This process has resulted in formation of a huge base of
operations, including facilities, ground and flight equipment, and trained
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Table 1. Year-wise Passengers Movements on Domestic Flights in Saudi Arabia
(in million)
Year Number of Passengers
1971 0.402
1972 0.526
1973 0.614
1974 0.756
1975 0.999
1976 1.959
1977 3.347
1978 4.444
1979 5.534
1980 6.828
1981 6.625
1982 7.270
1983 7.986
1984 7.940
1985 7.357
1986 6.861
1987 6.896
1988 6.717
1989 6.383
1990 6.803
1991 6.439
1992 7.625
1993 8.145
1994 8.009
Source: PCA statistical yearbook Presidency of Civil Aviation at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (various
issues).
personnel. Saudia currently has an active fleet of 52 aircrafts for scheduled
operations. Saudia has made a vital contribution to the development of the
country by linking the widely-separated centers of population in a country
which is as large as Western Europe and thus facilitating social and
economic cooperation between the various regions. Moreover, its
industrialization has benefited greatly by the speedy transportation of
foreign and Saudi workers on both Saudia’s international and domestic
routes. The current Saudia network consists of 63 stations (of which 25 are
domestic and 38 international stations). Average flights segments per day
are 265 with an average of 33 departures per day from international stations
and 232 departures per day from domestic stations. Saudia has to have
knowledge about the impacts of changes in economic forces on domestic
air travel demand in the Kingdom.
There are many factors affecting the air travel demand; each factor is
composed of elements that can stimulate or constrain air travel growth. For
air travel demand forecasting purpose, these factors are more conveniently
classified into two broad groups, those external to the airline industry and
those within the industry itself. The external environment includes those
factors that are outside the control of the individual airline and even the
entire airline industry. These basically include long-range economic,
social, demographic, and political trends. For example, the historical
development of a country, the age and income distribution of its population,
its ethnic and cultural ties to other nations, and its international business
linkage are all powerful influences on airline growth (BCAC, 1993).
Similarly, short-term conditions such as inflation, interest rate and currency
exchange rates can have a strong effect on the growth potential of both
individual airlines and the total industry. The major task is to predict the
future development of the first group (the external forces) so that the airline
can make the most intelligent decision on the second group.
The first task of this study is to determine the explanatory variables of
the econometric model for domestic air travel demand in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Reviewing and gathering information relevant to the
characteristics of the relationship as well as the studies already published
on the subject by other researchers has helped to make the following list of
the economic and demographic factors.
1. Oil Gross Domestic Product
2. Private Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product
3. Government Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product
4. Total Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product
5. Total Gross Domestic Product
6. Consumer Price Index
7. Per Capita Income
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8. Import of Goods and Services
9. Exchange Rate ( Saudi Riyals/Special Drawing Rights—SDR)
10. Exchange Rate ( Saudi Riyals/US$)
11. Population Size
12. Total Expenditures
13. Private Consumption Expenditures
14. Government Consumption Expenditures
15. Total Consumption Expenditures
16. Yield
DISCUSSION
The most important step in attempting to study the relationship between
variables is to express this relationship in mathematical form, that is, to
formulate or specify the model with which the economic phenomenon may
be explored empirically. Since the correlation matrix (Tables 2) shows a
high correlation between private non-oil GDP (0.93), government non-oil
GDP (0.93) and their total (0.93), the components of the non-oil GDP are
excluded and only the total was taken into consideration.
It is also observed from the correlation matrix that there is a low
correlation between the demand for domestic air travel and the oil GDP
(0.21). This can be explained from the findings of El-Masri (1982) in which
he pointed out that in the Kingdom the oil revenue accrues directly to the
government and the non-oil GDP is indirectly influenced by the
government oil revenue through mainly government expenditure. Khalid
Abdelrahman (1987) also state that the oil sector’s contribution to the labor
force is very low since the oil revenue goes directly to the government.
Moreover, the oil sector’s income has been fluctuating sharply during the
last years. Therefore, it is logical to disregard the oil sector from the model
for the demand for domestic air travel in the Kingdom.
The correlation matrix (Table 2) shows a high correlation between
private consumption expenditures (0.96), government consumption
expenditures (0.94) and their total (0.96). It is also found that there is
comparatively low correlation (-0.33) between the domestic air travel
demand and the yield that represents the cost of air travel. So yield variable
was also excluded from the model. From the above analysis, the following
list of variables relevant to the demand for the domestic air travel in the
Kingdom are considered.
 Total Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product (X4).
 Consumer Price Index (X6)
 Import of Goods and Services (X8)
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 Per Capita Income (X7)
 Population Size (X11).
 Total Expenditures (X12).
 Total Consumption Expenditures (X15).
Per Capita Income is the gross domestic product divided by the
population size. Because of their direct relation, gross domestic product
and per capita income may not exist together as explanatory variables of the
same model. The same thing can be said about population size and per
capita income. Total expenditures, total consumption expenditures and
gross domestic product have strong relations between them. Total
consumption expenditures is the total expenditures excluding investment
expenditures. Also, gross domestic product provides detailed analysis of
total spending. It measures, according to category of spending,
consumption, investment and net export. Based on the above discussion,
the model that represents the demand for domestic air travel may consist of
a subset of one of the following groups of variables.
Group I: (X4, X6, X8 , X11)
Group II:(X7, X6, X8)
Group III:(X12 , X6, X11)
Group IV:(X15 , X6, X11)
In the previous section, a long list of economic and demographic factors,
which may influence domestic air travel demand in the Kingdom has been
drawn up. At this step, from each group of the explanatory variables, a
subset of the group’s variables that appear most relevant to the demand for
domestic air travel are determined. A sequence of regression equations is
computed by using different combinations of the group’s variables through
stepwise regression procedure for selecting independent variables. At each
step, an independent variable is either added or deleted until the prediction
of the dependent variable Y does not significantly improve. There are
several methods available for adding and deleting variables. The criteria for
entering or removing an independent variable can be stated in terms of
reduction of the error sum of squares, partial correlation coefficient, or the
F statistics. These models or regression equations were developed using
SPSS. The SPSS output shows the relevant variables in every group that
best specify the model as follows.
Group I (X4, X6, X8, X11): the subset of the group’s variables which
appear most relevant and best specify the model is (X4, X6, X8)
Group II (X7, X6, X8): the subset of the group’s variables which appear
most relevant and best specify the model is ( X6, X8)
80 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
Group III (X12, X6 X11): the subset of the group’s variables, which appear
most relevant and best specify the model is ( X12, X11)
Group IV (X15, X6, X11): the subset of the group’s variables which appear
most relevant and best specify the model is ( X15, X6, X11)
From the SPSS output, the least-squares lines of these models are as
follows (the estimated t-values are in parentheses).
(1) Demand for domestic travel = Y = f(X4, X6, X8)
Y = - l.29982l + 0.011111 X4 + 0.023004 X6 + 0.025649 X8
(3.343) (2.463) ( 5.295)
(2) Demand for domestic travel = Y= f(X6, X8)
Y = - 1.6082 + 0.033608 X6 + 0.035039 X8
(3.087) (7.164)
(3) Demand for domestic travel = Y= f(X12, X11)
Y = - 2.961205 + 0.027701 X12 + 0.368102 X11
(12.067) (7.436)
(4) Demand for domestic travel = Y = f(X15, X6, X11)
Y = 0.0398 + 0.029538 X15 + 0.028203 X6 - 0.273172 X11
(2.771) (2.595) (6.429)
where
Y : Number of Passengers in Millions.
X4 :Total Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product in billion SR.
X6 : Consumer Price Index
X8 : Import of Goods and Services in billion SR.
X11: Population Size in Millions.
X12: Total Expenditures in billion SR.
X15: Total Consumption Expenditures in billion SR.
Testing Hypotheses. A frequently tested hypothesis is that there is no
linear relationship between X and Y that the slope of the population
regression line is zero. The statistic used to test this hypothesis is t statistics.
The t statistics and their two-tailed observed significance levels are
displayed. If a is set at 0.05 or 5 percent level, the two-tailed critical t value
is about 2.093 for 19 degrees of freedom (d.f.) If a is fixed at 0.01 or 1
percent level, the critical t value for 19 d.f. is 2.861 (two-tailed). The output
indicates significant linear relationship between the dependent and
independent variables in all the models since calculated t values exceed
critical t values.
The R-squared Coefficient. The coefficient of determination, R2, tells
the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can be explained
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by the independent variables. As shown in Table 3, R2 and adjusted R2
indicate that, for all the models, most of the observations fall on the
regression line. This means that a strong linear relationship exists between
the dependent variable and independent variables.
The F-test for Overall Significance. The F-test allows us to test the
significance of the overall regression model to be able to answer the
statistical question. Is there a significant relationship between the
dependent variable and the independent variables? Table 4 shows that F
values are high for all the models and the observed significance level is less
than 0.0005. The findings indicate that there is a significant relationship
between the dependent variable and the independent variables.
Measures of Autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson d statistics is used
to detect autocorrelation, i.e., to indicate whether there is any no correlation
between members of observations ordered in time. If computed d value is
closer to zero, there is evidence of positive autocorrelation, but if it is closer
to 4, there is evidience of negative autocorrelation. And the closer the d
value is to 2, the more the evidence is in favor of no autocorrelation. The
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Table 3. R2 and Adjusted R2 for Domestic Air Travel Demand Model
Models R2 Adjusted R2
F(X4 , X6 , X8) 0.969 0.964
F(X7 , X6 , X8) 0.9508 0.954
F(X12, X11) 0.96 0.955
F(X15 , X6) 0.961 0.955
Table 4. F-values for Domestic Air Travel Demand Model
Models F-value
f(X4 , X6 , X8) F = 192
f(X6 , X8) F = 184
f(X12, X11) F = 226
f(X15 , X6 , X11) F = 150
Table 5. Computed d values for Domestic Air Travel Demand Model
Models d-value
f(X4 , X6 , X8) 1.02
f(6X , X8) .80
f(X12, X11) 1.31
f(X15 , X6 , X11) 1.43
computed d values for domestic air travel demand models are shown in
Table 5.
Measure of Collinearity Collinearity refers to the situation in which
there is a high multiple correlation when one of the independent variables is
regressed on the others, that is, there is a high correlation between
independent variables. The tolerance of a variable is commonly used to
measure collinearity. The tolerance of a variable is defined as 1- R2, Ri is
the multiple correlation coefficient when the ith independent variable is
predicted from the other independent variables. If the tolerance of variable
is small, it is almost a linear combination of the other independent
variables. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is closely related to the
tolerance. As the Variance inflation factor increases, so does the variance of
regression coefficients. The SPSS output shows that high correlation exists
between the independent variables of the domestic air travel models:
f(X6, X8), f(X15, X6, X11) and f(X4, X6, X8) model. The model
f(X12, X11) does not suffer from multicollenerity. However,
multicollinearity may arise because there is a tendency of economic
variables to move together over time.
RESULTS
There are various ways of reporting the results of regression analysis,
but here the following format is used. The first fact to note about the
regression results is that all the coefficients have the signs that are expected
by economic theory. For instance, the population size has a positive effect
on domestic air travel demand—holding other things the same, as the
population size goes up by 1.000 percentage point, on the average demand
for domestic air travel goes up by 0.368 percentage points. Likewise, if the
total expenditure goes up by 1.000 percentage point, on the average
demand for domestic air travel goes up by 0.027 percentage points, holding
the other things same.
In Table 6, the figures in the first set of parentheses are the estimated
standard errors of the regression coefficients and those in the second set of
parentheses are the estimated t-values computed from the expression under
the null hypothesis that the true population value of each regression
coefficient individually is zero. Hence, the two-tailed t-test can be used to
test whether such a null hypothesis stands up against the (two-sided)
alternative hypothesis that each true population coefficient is different from
zero. The degrees of freedom are 19, which are obtained by subtracting the
number of parameters estimated, which are 3 in the present instance from
n (=22). If a is set at 0.05, the two-tailed critical t value is about 2.093 for
19 d.f. If a is fixed at 0.01 or 1 percent level, the critical t value for 19 d.f. is
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2.861 (two-tailed). Looking at the t-values presented in Table 6, partial
regression coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the
1 percent level of significance.
What about the overall significance of the estimated regression line?
That is, can the null hypothesis that the partial slope is simultaneously
equal to zero or, equivalently R2 = 0 be accepted? This hypothesis was
tested with the help of an F-test. The F value has an F distribution with 2
and 19 d.f. If a is set at 0.05, the F table shows the critical F value of 4.38.
The corresponding value at a = 0.01 is 8.18. The computed F of 226 far
exceeds either of these critical F values. Therefore, the null hypothesis that
the partial slope is simultaneously equal to zero or, alternatively R2 = 0 is
rejected. Collectively and individually the two explanatory variables
influence the dependent variable (domestic air travel demand). Since the
computed d value in the model is closer to 2, the evidence is in favor of no
autocorrelation as shown in Table 6.
The previous analysis shows that all the developed models for domestic
travel demand are well fitting. However, these models, except the f(X12,
X11) model, suffer from the existence of multicollenerity. This is clear
because most of the independent variables have small tolerance and high
variance inflation factor (VIF). This means that they are almost linear
combinations of the other independent variables and indicate high variance
of the regression coefficients. The correlation matrix shown in Table 2 also
support this evidence.
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Table 6. The Determinants of Air Travel Demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(Least square coefficients with standard errors and absolute t-values in parentheses)
Independent Variables Domestic Air Travel International Air
Demand Model Travel Demand Model*
X11: Population Size in million 0.368102 0.39522 0
Se (.049504) (.041881)
T ( 7.436) ( 9.437 )
X12: Total Expenditures in billion 0.027701 0.021314
Se (.002296) (.001942)
T (12.067) (10.975)
Constant -2.961205 -2.2566
Adj- R2 0.955 0.959
N 22 22
F 226 244
DW 1.309 2.016
*Study results of Abed, el. al. (1998), An econometric Analysis of International Air Travel Demand in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
CONCLUSION
Here domestic air travel demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
through identifying its determinants have been analyzed. Air transportation
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has undergone considerable expansions
and developments during the past years. There was a high air traffic growth
rate percentage between 1971 and 1992, which reflects the growth in the
Saudi economy during this period.
The statistical analysis of the past travel trends and the variables that
may have an impact on it has also been undertaken. The analysis indicates
the existence of high correlation between the economic variables. This
might arise because there is a tendency of economic variables to move
together over time. The statistical analysis shows a strong relationship
between the air travel demand and the economic activity in the Kingdom.
An empirical examination of the determinants of domestic air travel
demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been presented in the paper.
Econometric models were attempted to forecast domestic air travel demand
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the previous sections. Through the
models the statistical relationship between selected demand-influencing
factors and the corresponding level of traffic is developed. From the
statistical measures for evaluating the models as discussed earlier, the
following model is found to be the most appropriate model to represent
domestic air travel demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Domestic air travel demand ( Y )= -2.961205 + 0.027701 X12+ 0.368102 X11
where
Y : Number of passengers in millions
X11: Population Size in millions.
X12: Total Expenditures in billion SR.
This model is very good in terms of Goodness of Fit measures and does
not suffer from multicollinearity. The rest of the developed models suffered
from severe multicollinearity which reduce the forecaster’s ability to draw
inferences about the significance of individual variables and cause the
estimators to have large variances. However, since the goal of the study is to
use the model to predict the future data of the dependent variable (i.e., the
number of passengers in million), collinearity per se may not be bad.
This proposed model may help determine future demand for domestic
air travel in the Kingdom. The study may also provide a policy guideline to
civil aviation authority in studying the proper sizing of airports facilities
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such as gate requirements, apron size, terminal capacity, etc., through
coordination with airport consultants. The airlines could utilize the model
for long term forecasting of the demand for domestic air travel in the
Kingdom. Based on the air traffic forecasts determined through the model,
they can develop a corporate plan that may reflect the present situation,
capacity utilization, manpower requirements and training plans, financial
projections for the operating capital projects, and other projects.
REFERENCES
Alperovich, G. & Machnes, Y. (1994). The role of wealth in the demand for international air
travel, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 28 (2).
Abdulrahman, K. (1990, February). Money demand & money supply in Saudi Arabia an
empirical study, Unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, UK.
Abed, S. Y., Bafial, A. O. & Jasimuddin, S. M. (1998). An econometric analysis of
international air travel demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, mimeo, King Abdulaziz
University, Jeddah.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company (BCAC). (1993). Airline Evaluation Seminar.
Boeing Commercial Company (BCC). (1987). Air Freight, Air Travel, and Strategic
Planning, UK.
El-Masri. (1982). Passenger profiles surveys. Economic Research Department in Saudi
Arabian Airlines, Saudi Arabia.
Ghobrial, A. (1992). Aggregate demand model For domestic airlines. Journal of Advanced
Transportation. Canada.
Howard, G P. (1974). Airport economic planning. The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. U.S.A.
IMF. (1994). Statistics Department, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. vol. Xlvii,
the USA.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (1992). Achievements of the development plans. Ministry of
Planning.
Microsoft Corporation. (1994). Building Application Using Microsoft Access.
Ministry of Planning. (1992).
Poore, J. W. (1993, September). Forecasting the demand for air transportation services.
Journal of Transportation Engineering. USA.
Presidency of Civil Aviation at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (1991). PCA statistical
yearbooks, Ministry of Planning. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Presidency of Civil Aviation at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (1970). PCA statistical
yearbooks, Ministry of Planning. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabian Bechtel Company. (1979, July). Update forecast and planning assumptions.
New Riyadh International Airport.
Siddiqui, A. (1994, July). Operating levels and airline economics. Saudia World.
SPSS Inc. (1993, June). SPSS User Manual, Release 6. U. S. A.
86 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
THE CASE OF MORRIS AIR: A
SUCCESSFUL STARTUP
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ABSTRACT
Morris Air, which began scheduled operations in 1992, provides an example of a start-up
airline that succeeded during the dark days of U.S. commercial aviation in the early 1990s.
Morris Air benefited from a favorable regulatory climate for start-ups but owed most of its
success to innovations in cutting costs and to its discipline in filling a well-defined market
niche. When Morris Air began to hurt the operations of the major airlines, particularly Delta’s
hub at Salt Lake City, it began to suffer from aggressive responses that could be considered
predatory. Morris Air was sold to Southwest Airlines at the end of 1993, resulting in
substantial capital gains for its shareholders. There is evidence that Morris Air’s founder
anticipated a sale to Southwest from the time she incorporated the airline.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines an unusual case, that of a start-up airline that
achieved competitive and financial success in the early 1990s, a
particularly difficult time for commercial aviation in the United States. The
aim of the paper is to identify factors that contributed to the firm’s success.
Understanding the conditions under which the airline operated and the way
it responded may be useful to future start-ups, particularly if they begin
operations during a period of industry downturn. No broad policy
recommendations are made in this paper; although the reader may come to
his or her own conclusions regarding how regulatory agencies can assist
start-ups based on the case.
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In early summer 1992, regulators at the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) received a complaint from an unnamed competitor
about a small charter operator and bulk fare contractor based in Salt Lake
City.1 The regulators did not remember having heard of the operator
before.2 They checked their records and found that it began operations in
1984 flying one charter flight a week, was a division of a travel agency, was
duly registered as a separate charter operator in 19873, and had
accumulated only seven customer complaints over the previous five years.4
In 1991 the company offered about 300 flights (about 40,000 seats) per
week throughout the western United States and took in about $80 million in
revenues. Its charters were flown by Ryan International Airlines and Sierra
Pacific, to which the company subleased 11 Boeing 737s that it itself had
leased from International Lease Financing Corporation, Polaris, and other
aircraft leasing companies.5
The competitor accused the company of deceptively holding itself out as
a scheduled carrier. The competitor claimed that the charter staffed its own
ticket counters and curbside baggage service at several airports; painted its
livery on some of Ryan’s aircraft; developed its own computer reservations
system; and allowed passengers to pay for tickets by credit card, cash, or
money orders made out to its name. Under DOT regulations, payments to a
charter company must be by check or money order made payable to an
escrow account.6
Subsequent investigation by the DOT found that the company’s radio,
television, and newspaper advertisements gave the impression that it was a
regularly scheduled airline offering service between many city-pairs with
connecting flights and a business class program. There was no indication
that the flights were charters, and the direct air carrier was either not
identified or its identity was printed in small inconspicuous type.7 Among
the evidence pointing to violation of the rules was a proposal to the Postal
Service for mail carriage as a certificated air carrier.8 The company had also
published a flight schedule.9
The DOT assessed a $200,000 fine against the company at the beginning
of November 1992. One half of the fine was to be paid immediately, and the
other would be waived if the company changed its practices. The company
agreed to the terms, “…to forestall costly legal fees…” and without
admitting guilt.10
The company also agreed quickly because of a decision it had made
when it learned of the competitor’s complaint: it had decided to seek a DOT
certificate for scheduled service.11 Resolving the complaint allowed the
certificate petition to go ahead.12
The company’s decision to seek a scheduled service certificate also
derived from its observation that the DOT and the Federal Aviation
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Administration (FAA) were uncomfortable with a non-airline company
which had obtained operational control of a large number of aircraft, as it
had with its leases. In addition, the company had experienced some
difficulty arranging for aircraft leases because it lacked an airline
certificate. In one case involving a 737-300, a lender indicated that it would
not close the loan until the company obtained a certificate.13
DOT issued the company a 401 certificate at the beginning of December
1992.14 The company was Morris Air.
WHO WAS MORRIS AIR?
In 1970 Lorna June Mayer Morris, then 40 years old, founded the travel
agency that would later begin the charter flights that would later become
Morris Air. Although the formal connection between the agency and the
charter service would be severed when June Morris sold the agency to
employees in 1987, Morris’ experience as an agent and her established
client base would serve her well as the head of an airline. When the now-
scheduled Morris Air incorporated in December 1992 as a Delaware S
Corporation, June Morris and her relatives retained control of the closely
held, family-owned company. June served as CEO and her son Richard
Frendt as Chairman of the Board. Other Directors were David G. Neeleman
(also appointed as President), Mitch Morris (June’s husband), Michael
Lazarus (her banker), and Martin Hart. Usto Shulz served as Vice President
and General Manager and Kent H. Collins as General Counsel.15
The mix of executives turned out to be a good one. Neeleman, a 23-year-
old college dropout and failed travel business proprietor when he joined
Morris, was the rambunctious ideas man. Frendt, an MBA, was the
numbers man and incessant cost cutter. Shulz was brought on board for his
operational experience and knowledge of the Federal regulatory
bureaucracy. Collins and Frendt shared the role of corporate spokesman.
Behind all was the presence of June Morris, who gave the company its
direction and reined in the others when their ideas went beyond common
sense.16
The firm was capitalized at $14,750,000 issued in convertible preferred
stock.17 Morris Air relied on this money, reinvested profits, and long-term
debt financing throughout its existence, although continued expansion later
made it difficult to not consider going public or using the services of a
venture capitalist.18
THE BATTLEFIELD
Morris Air entered the industry at a distinctly inauspicious time. The
preceding years had been the worst in the history of the American civil
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aviation business. The airlines’ problems could not fail to be noted even by
those who paid little attention to the industry. In 1991, Pan Am, Eastern,
and Midway folded. America West filed Chapter 11. The following year,
TWA went into Chapter 11.19 Between 1990 and 1993, return on
investment (ROI), net profit, and net profit margins were all negative across
the industry. Airlines were suffering the effects of a recession, higher oil
prices, and fear of terrorism because of the Persian Gulf War.20 Demand
was softening, particularly among high yield business travelers.
Corporations were laying off managers and cutting travel budgets.21 In
addition, there was a surge of cost consciousness among all consumers,
business and leisure.22 The decision to enter the business at that time, said
June Morris, “…took a little corporate courage, or being a little nuts.”23
COBELLIGERANTS
There were apparently a lot of nuts in the airline business. According to
then-Transportation Secretary Federico Pea, more than 100 start up airlines
sought approval to fly in the year before May 1993.24 Some of those that
were approved, apart from Morris, were Carnival, Casino Express, Kiwi,
LeisureAir, MarkAir, Reno, Spirit, Sun Country, Tower, and UltrAir.25
The new entrants faced several economic advantages over the first wave
of new airlines that formed shortly after deregulation in 1978. First, many
markets were uncontested.26 Second, public sources of capital abounded.27
Third, there was a glut of commercial jets available for sale or lease. About
650 jets were on the market at the end of 1992, about three times as many as
in the late 1980’s.28 Lastly, cutbacks at the majors left a huge number of
experienced personnel unemployed and desperate for work. Between 1990
and 1992, more than 50,000 industry employees lost their jobs.29
According to Wall Street airline analyst Candace Browning, the “new
entrant carriers [could] hire 20-year experienced pilots for $50 an hour,
which means that they would earn less than $50,000 per year.”30 Upstarts
were thus able to avoid unionization and exact significant concessions from
their employees.31
The new airlines also shared a strategy. At least initially, they tried to
stay in a niche to avoid the wrath of the majors and to avoid growing too
fast.32 According to the then General Accounting Office (GAO) Director of
Transportation and Telecommunications Issues, the startups tended to offer
high frequency, low frills, point-to-point service, and focus on low costs.
This allowed them to charge much less than established airlines.33 The new
companies also tended to forego yield management: they sold only
unrestricted fares and sometimes only coach class tickets.34
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HELP FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The upstarts also benefited from a policy of active support on the part of
Clinton Administration transportation officials. After the Reagan and Bush
Administrations paid little attention to new airlines, the new
Administration tried to guide them through regulatory hurdles and protect
them from predation. Referring to one case in which the Transportation
Department successfully intervened when Northwest began flying to Reno
in retaliation for Reno Air’s opening of a new route to Northwest’s
Minneapolis hub, then-Secretary Federico F. Pea said that “we will do
whatever we can to make sure fledgling carriers have a fair shot.”35 And
again, “DOT’s staff assists new entrepreneurs in forming new airlines. And
we have sent a clear signal to the industry that this Administration will not
allow large carriers to compete unfairly against the new entrants.”36 Indeed,
there is evidence that the relatively small fine imposed on Morris Air for its
charter violations was a direct result of the Administration’s policy of
encouraging new entrants.37
THE STRATEGIC IDEA
June Morris and her key executives defined the characteristics for their
new company. It would be a low cost, low frills, low price, short haul
(average stage length 483 miles38), point-to-point jet carrier. In contrast to
the majority of the new startups, it would offer low frequency service (an
average of only two departures daily).39 Those characteristics, particularly
the last, defined a niche, a market, and a strategy for the company: Morris
Air would create new business by getting leisure travelers who otherwise
could not afford it to fly. As June Morris put it, “…we’re taking people off
the road and getting people who otherwise might not go anywhere at all.”40
“Our competition is really the automobile.”41
In formal economic terms, Morris Air would exploit the income effect of
lower prices. When a company establishes prices, which are lower than
those of its competitors, it benefits from two effects on the behavior of
customers. First, customers will be drawn from the competitors because the
relative price is lower than theirs is. Second, customers will be able to save
money, afford more of the good in question, and buy more of it. This is
called the income effect.42
Since businessmen’s travel is generally little affected by the income
effect,43 Morris was giving up one of the most lucrative segments of the
market. It instead would concentrate on leisure and visiting friends and
relatives (VFR) clients. According to Frendt, We specialize in getting
grandkids and grandparents together. We’re not trying to get the business
flyer; we handle mostly leisure travelers.44
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Morris reckoned that appealing only to the low end of the market would
allow the company several advantages. First, Morris Air could cut costs
beyond other carriers without risking complaints about receiving
unaccustomedly bare service. The airline would have to offer only a few
departures a day because leisure travelers, as opposed to business travelers,
plan on leaving on a particular day rather than at a particular hour.45
Second, the strategy would keep Morris Air out of the sights of the bigger
carriers. It was banking on the assumption that the big lines would rather
lose a tiny bit of market share than absorb the high cost of driving the
newcomer from the market.46
Throughout its existence, Morris Air would remain true to its vision.
This discipline earned it praise from airline industry analysts like Dan
Hersh: They know what they are and what they aren’t. You won’t see them
flying to New York or Boston or pushing a frequent flyer program.47 Even
competitors like Delta spokesman Clay McConnell respected it: “[Morris]
has been extremely successful because they [sic] have stayed in a niche.
Some other low-cost carriers have not done that, and they’ve failed
miserably.”48 Surveying a battlefield littered with dead and dying air
carriers, June Morris herself was very conscious of treading carefully: “We
want to do it in a very controlled way, and not get in a big uproar here.”49
AXING COSTS
To keep prices down and appeal to bus travelers, Morris Air needed to
make its costs the lowest in the business. Morris executives had lots of ideas
to keep cost down so that the company could offer the lowest fares. The
company decided early on that it would contract out most operational
functions, lease aircraft and crews, not participate in computer reservation
systems (CRS)50 (saving $2.25 per flight segment51), fly only one type of
aircraft (the Boeing 737-300) to simplify training and maintenance, fly no
route longer than 2-1/2 hours (to avoid serving hot meals), and offer only
one class of service.52 To boost economies of scale on each flight, Morris
decided to stuff 143 passengers into its 737-300s, 15 more than specified by
Boeing in its promotional literature about the aircraft’s capabilities.53
In addition, Morris employed the following tricks to pare costs:
 Use plastic boarding cards
 Use laser bar code readers on luggage
 Limit traveling executives to $25 for meals per day
 Offer premiums to employees who stayed with relatives or friends
when traveling54
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 Fly at off times to avoid congestion55
 Wrap in-flight magazines in plastic to extend their life and discourage
pilferage.56
Morris also enjoyed the cost savings due to the airplane and labor glut
that other startups experienced. Like Southwest Airlines, Morris benefited
from less time on the ground and better aircraft utilization rates because of
its choice to fly at less congested times and point-to-point instead of
through hubs.57
These factors, along with others discussed below, gave Morris the lowest
costs in the industry. In 1993 the U.S. airline industry’s operating cost per
available seat-mile (ASM) was 10.5 cents. Southwest pushed its ASM
down to 7.03 cents. Morris’ ASM was 6.0 cents.58
Lessened Startup Costs
Although a new carrier, Morris was able to escape many of the startup
costs, which upstarts have to face. A new entrant generally must assemble
financing; gather management and operational personnel; secure office
space and equipment, aircraft, ground equipment and services, airport
gates, and maintenance facilities.59 Morris had already done these things
when it was a charter. In the city-pairs it already served as a charter, it did
not have to pay ramp up costs of marketing the service, generating
consumer familiarity with the carrier, and establishing patronage.60
Fleet
Morris achieved additional cost savings by hewing to its decision to fly
only one type of aircraft, the Boeing 737-300. This aircraft is relatively
inexpensive (roughly $35 million new compared to $170 million for a 747),
employs relatively new technology yet is well proven (over 1,000 ordered),
and has performance characteristics appropriate for the short-hop service
envisioned by Morris Air.61
More important than the choice of aircraft was the discipline to stick to
one type. Southwest estimates that it saves up to 25 percent in maintenance,
parts inventory, and training by using only one airframe—the same 737-
300.62 Morris accrued additional savings by leasing a majority of its
aircraft, mostly from International Lease Finance Corporation.63 Although
Frendt said in 1992 that Morris’ goal was to achieve a 50-50 mix of owned
and leased aircraft,64 that goal was never achieved. Morris only ever owned
three aircraft, out of a fleet of 21.65 Morris also contracted out for its
maintenance. Pemco Aeroplex performed routine maintenance,
modifications, and painting work.66
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Morris Air’s leasing policy allowed it to maintain one of the youngest
fleets in the industry; the company’s average aircraft was 6 years old.67
Other upstarts of the period owned aircraft of vintages more suitable to
wines than passenger-carrying jets. Laker’s planes dated from 1968 and
1969, Key’s from 1965 to 1972, and Kiwi’s from circa 1974.68 The fleet’s
youth had important, positive effects on Morris’ safety record. The airline
never suffered an accident.69
Labor
Morris took full advantage of the depressed air transport labor market
discussed above to hire pilots, flight attendants, ticketing agents, and other
personnel on the cheap. There was never a successful attempt to organize at
the airline, so Morris was able to avoid the confrontations with unions,
which paralyzed the rest of the industry in 1993 (the year of the four day
walkout by American flight attendants broken only by the intervention of
President Clinton).70
June Morris instituted an innovative program to reduce labor costs in
areas, which required few skills or training: she hired students. College
students primarily staffed the company’s telephone reservation and ticket
sales lines. For even less demanding jobs, such as tagging baggage, high
school Go Getters were hired at $5 per hour.71 The high school students
took the jobs because they saw them as a way to get early experience in the
business world.72 Morris Air thus had access to additional cheap labor in
the summer, when leisure travel is at its peak.
Ticketless Travel
The most interesting cost-cutting innovation, which Morris had, and the
most important for the future of the industry was the invention of ticketless
travel. David Evans, Vice President of Information Systems for the carrier,
first came up with the idea.73 Morris saved the cost of paper, printing,
postage, and labor amounting to about $2 for each of the 12,000 tickets it
issued a day and spared passengers the frustration of long lines at ticket
counters and the possibility of losing a ticket.74
The innovation was initially fiercely resisted by travel agents who saw it
as yet another sign that Morris was trying to cut them out as middlemen
between the airline and its customers and because the new system would
disrupt their accounting and reporting practices.75 While Morris officials
touted the new system as the wave of the future, others in the industry either
did not understand it or ridiculed it. Chris Chiames, a spokesman for the Air
Transport Association, asked, “Will you be tattooed instead?” A Delta
spokesman said that ticketless travel “may have a place in the future, but it’s
not the future yet.”76
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MARKETING
Routes
Domestically, Morris operated exclusively in the western United States.
It limited itself to this area because its experience in the West as a charter
and because the West was less congested so that it could serve secondary
markets without bumping up against the majors. Salt Lake City served the
carrier as a de facto hub despite Morris’ declared point-to point strategy.
About half of Morris’ flights involved Salt Lake.77 Morris likely could not
resist taking advantage of its monopsony power at the airport to negotiate
favorable gate, landing, scheduling, financial, and other terms. In March
1993, Morris share of origin and destination traffic at the airport was
24 percent.78 Its portion of total enplanements was even higher. Tucson,
which was the city with the most flights after Salt Lake, formed a mini
hub.79 The rest of Morris’ 22 city net was point to point.
Morris also offered summer seasonal service to popular vacation spots
in and out of the U.S. Domestically, it serviced Orlando from Salt Lake and
Fairbanks from Seattle. It occasionally flew to Hawaii as well.
Internationally, it flew to Ontario and to the Mexican resort communities of
Puerto Vallarta, Cancun, Mazatlan, and Cabo San Lucas. The flights to
Mexico began in December and ended around Easter.80
Pricing
With its costs well below the rest of the industry, Morris was ready to
offer its services at low prices to the low budget market. The best way to
show Morris’ impact is to compare the unrestricted round trip fares that it
offered in various city pairs to the next cheapest airline. This is shown in
Table 1.
Table 1. Cost of Unrestricted Round Trip Fares of Morris Air and Competitors, 1992
Route Morris Air Competitor
Los Angeles-Salt Lake City $178 $258 (Delta)
Oakland-Seattle $178 $820 (Alaska)
Oakland-Portland $178 $760 (Alaska)
Phoenix-Salt Lake City $178 $720 (Delta)
Seattle-Salt Lake City $178 $258 (Delta)
Note: All fares from early May 1993.81
True to income effect theory, passenger traffic exploded in response to
Morris’ prices in the markets it served.82 For example, when Morris began
flights between Seattle and Spokane, competing with Alaska, which flew
43,000 passengers per quarter, the market more than doubled to over
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90,000.83 Not all this increase went to Morris. To combat the new company,
majors serving the same markets dropped their fares by 50 percent and in
some cities (such as Denver) offered double frequent flier miles.84
Still, many budget-minded passengers continued to favor Morris
because of its lack of restrictions. A single day round trip flight from
Denver to Salt Lake in May 1993 cost $141 on Morris Air; United wanted
$525 because there would be no Saturday stay-over.85 Indeed, Morris’ only
restrictions had to do with penalties for cancellations and premiums for 14-
day advance booking. Although the airline primarily offered one class of
coach service, in some markets it offered a business class as well, which
allowed cancellations without penalties and offered pre-assigned seating.86
Morris also experimented with companion fares where one person flew at
full price and a companion at a reduced fare.87
Morris’ low prices and lack of restrictions had their intended income
effect. Frendt said, “People love to fly. If the fare’s right, the market is
incredibly elastic.”88 The airline’s planes, painted white with a blue tail,
soon filled up with new air travelers: “Morris Air carries a mix of
passengers that looks familiar to anyone who has traveled on either
Greyhound or Amtrak… Lots of denim and polyester; not a briefcase or a
power suit in sight.”89
One unanticipated, positive result of going after the low end market was
a large number of advanced bookings allowing more certainty about
maximizing the output of each flight without using complicated and
confusing yield management techniques. Frendt reported, “The people who
book in advance really are the price-conscious ones. I would guess our
advance bookings are stronger [than the competition] because the reason
you book in advance is because you really care about every dollar.”90
Morris’ low cost, low frequency strategy guaranteed high load factors,
85-95 percent, at a time when the industry average was 62 percent.91 Morris
was not afraid to tell customers that it had sold out a flight-which would
only confirm customer perceptions that the airline’s fares were a good deal.
Load factors determined how Morris increased its frequencies in given
markets. “Load factors will build up to 90 percent, and then they’ll add a
second flight, let that build to 90 percent and then add a third,” according to
one Morris observer.92
Stuart Thatcher, Morris Director of Marketing, supplemented the
airline’s low cost, few restrictions strategy with two additional innovations.
First, building on the charter company’s experience, he introduced ski
packages with interchangeable ski lift tickets included in the fares. The
packages were so successful that Morris thrived after big snowfalls in the
Rockies: skiers flew into the Rockies and snow-weary Utahns flew out.93
Second, Thatcher experimented with selling tickets via the Home Shopping
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Network in certain markets. The initiative was aimed at impulse buyers,
“people who will spontaneously decide to go visit Aunt Mabel in
Oakland.”94
Apart from gimmicks like these, Morris did not strive to build brand
loyalty on the basis of amenities. Besides its low prices, Morris offered
only one feature, which set it apart from other budget carriers. It served big,
fluffy Costco muffins. They gave Morris a cult following of sorts.95
Reservation System
Morris decided to eschew participation in Computer Reservation
Systems (CRSs) to save money. Explaining the decision, Frendt said that
the airline saved $2.50 per segment by not participating “It’s kind of a
Catch 22 situation, because we need travel agents so bad, but it’s so darn
expensive. Every decision we make is based on keeping our cost low. Our
long-term survival depends on it.”96
Morris’ non-participation meant that its flights, but not its fares, were
listed in the CRSs. More importantly, agents could not book passengers
automatically (they could however validate bookings and drive a ticket).
The agents had to call the airline, which then manually input ticket
information into a computer.97 Fortunately for Morris, passengers could
book their own tickets directly by using the same method. Throughout
Morris’ existence, about 60 percent of its tickets were sold directly to
customers. The rest were sold to agents who called the airline or to a few,
high-volume agents with a special system. For the latter, Morris installed a
direct data link, via inexpensive PCs and printers, for free.98
Morris Air’s decision not to participate in a CRS brought it into a
controversy with System One Corporation, the fourth largest U.S.-based
CRS. Since System One displayed partial data on Morris, it requested a
payment of $0.50 per segment every time a ticket was printed. Other
partially displayed carriers, Aeroflot, Air Quebec, American Trans Air,
Arizona Airways, and Chicago Express, all agreed to pay the fee. Morris,
along with Southwest, refused.99 System One decided to cancel the $0.50
fee.100
Failure to participate in a CRS got Morris into bigger trouble with some
travel agents. Agents who booked a substantial amount of Morris fares lost
money because the transactions were not recorded in their productivity
contracts, which formed the basis of their automation pricing. Such firms
had to make complicated arrangements with both Morris Air, to receive
faxes summarizing daily sales, and a CRS, to apply Morris bookings
toward their monthly productivity thresholds.101
These problems led two travel agents, both Association of Retail Travel
Agents (ARTA) board members, to call for a boycott of Morris Air. Jack
Schultz and Schultz 97
Stults of Joplin, Missouri and Susan Bruno of Los Altos, California, said
that they would discontinue selling fares for the airline until it fully
participated in System One and discontinued marketing programs, which
were intended to bypass travel agencies. They accused Morris of trying to
get direct bookings.
The two based their actions on ARTA objectives 9 and 4. Objective 9
stated, “Agency bypass is a major problem in our industry. Agents and
suppliers must work together to structure marketing and advertising
programs to support rather than avoid the travel agent distributions
system.” Objective 4 stated, “ARTA urges all airlines that wish to receive
full benefits of the agency distribution system to fully participate in all CRS
systems.” The boycott came to naught because of antitrust concerns.
Neither Stults nor Bruno had consulted their lawyers who would have told
them that their status as ARTA board members made their actions legally
problematic.102
COMPETITION
This section cannot be called Competition and Cooperation because
Morris went it alone. It did not participate in any alliances, interline or code
sharing agreements. Passengers with connections to other airlines had to
fend for themselves and their luggage.103
As the price leader, Morris initially suffered little from price
competition. On the other hand, Morris did hurt the code-sharing partners
of the majors at their vulnerable hubs.104 In addition, Morris also adversely
affected the plans and profits of two majors, Alaska Air Group and Delta.
Alaska
Put simply, Morris devastated Alaska Airlines and Horizon, both
subsidiaries of the Alaska Air Group, in the routes served by Morris.
Horizon was overpriced and Alaska was excessively overpriced. Alaska
took pride in having won the first J. D. Power award for regional airline
excellence in 1992.105 The readers of Conde Nast Traveler Magazine had
also elected it the best U.S. carrier for the fifth consecutive year.106 It had
obtained these distinctions by offering the some of the best amenities and
service in the industry. The amenities sometimes went to excess: two linen
tablecloths per service tray, three pieces of French toast per breakfast, etc.
These extravagances combined with the high costs of doing business in the
state of Alaska made the airline’s operating cost per seat mile 11.5 cents.107
The recession of the early 1990s and consequent cost consciousness of
air travelers hurt Alaska: its flights averaged load factors of just above 50
percent in 1992–1993.108 The company lost a staggering $85 million in
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1992109 and $30 million in 1993.110
Alaska recognized that about half of its losses were due to competition
from small start ups, and it singled out Morris as the most threatening.
Harry Lehr, Alaska’s Vice President of Planning, said that pressure from
low cost upstarts, bottom feeders in his words, was building and that Morris
was a trying opponent: “[June Morris] is a very sharp lady. She knows what
she’s doing. They’re picking a niche, they’re strong in it, and they’re doing
very well.”111 Alaska finally matched Morris’ fares in an effort to stop
diversion of passengers to the smaller airline.112 It was clear, however, that
Morris’ cost structure would allow it to sustain a fare war for much longer
than Alaska, which was not willing to sacrifice the reputation for superior
service, which had become so important to it.
Delta
Morris faced much stiffer competition from Delta. Initially, the big
airline ignored Morris Air. Overlooking the upstart was a mistake the major
would one day publicly regret. Delta’s Vice President of Marketing, Robert
W. Coggin, said, “We were so chagrined about not being more aggressive
with Morris Air in Salt Lake, we were going to be very aggressive [with
other low cost carriers].”113
Delta’s indifference changed when the upstart threatened its dominance
at its Salt Lake City hub, used primarily for connecting flights. Delta had
already invested almost $2 billion at Salt Lake and had 4,300 employees
working there.114 The major also planned to establish its second largest
reservations center at the city and begin long-haul service from Salt Lake to
London’s Gatwick Airport.115 Delta could not ignore competition, which
threatened its long-range plans for Salt Lake. According to Delta
spokesman Neil Monroe, “Inroads have been made [into Delta’s market
share] by Morris. We have a tremendous investment in Salt Lake City, and
in order to continue that hub’s success, we have to retain local market
share.”116
At the time, Delta had suffered worldwide losses, which probably
contributed to its determination not to be upstaged by little Morris. Delta
had an operating loss of $450 million in 1991, a $675 million loss in 1992,
and a $563 million loss for the first nine months of 1993.117 The financial
toll and necessary countermeasures were wrenching to an airline, which
had always considered itself superior to the competition in morale,
customer service, and financial performance.118
Delta finally responded to Morris’ growth at the end of 1992 by slashing
its fares by 50 percent and offering double frequent flyer mileage on flights
involving Salt Lake City. Morris was little affected however; as its fares
remained lower than Delta’s, up to 35 percent lower on some routes.119
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Delta finally decided to match Morris’ fares out of Salt Lake in May
1993.120 By then Morris had established itself in the market and did not get
knocked out. Near the end of Morris’ existence, however, Delta became
even more aggressive. In December 1993 it announced low fare service to
Albuquerque from Salt Lake. Morris had been planning to enter that market
at a higher fare at the beginning of 1994.121 It was unclear how much longer
the new entrant could survive Delta’s attention.
Predation
Delta supplemented its aggressive (some would say predatory) pricing
and frequent flyer bonuses with one additional trick: market share travel
agent overrides. In testimony before the National Commission to Ensure a
Strong Competitive Airline Industry, Morris President David Neeleman
appealed for an end to the practice in which airlines paid travel agents cash
incentives when the agents increased the airline’s proportion of total tickets
sold. Neeleman noted that the overrides make it difficult for travel agencies
to support a start-up carrier for fear of losing the incentives.
In Morris’ case, Neeleman stated that all major Utah travel agencies had
overrides based on market shares with Delta, and the agencies had told him
privately that they could not support Morris aggressively because of the
incentives.122 After making these remarks, Neeleman was approached by
Department of Justice officials for additional information. A few months
later, the Department launched an investigation of Delta’s “marketing
practices that may be used to maintain hub dominance.”123
The bonuses were common in the industry. A 1992 Travel Weekly
survey found that 69 percent of agencies had received them and that two-
thirds of the agencies reported that the bonuses were sometimes or usually
a factor in which airlines they chose for customers.124 Although the
Department of Justice later widened its probe to include TWA, Continental,
United, American, USAir, and Northwest,125 Delta remained a focus of the
investigation.
It was discovered that Delta sent a memo to Utah travel agents in
summer 1993 reminding them of their obligation to report Morris Air ticket
sales to the Airline Reporting Corporation (ARC). The ARC usually serves
as an industry clearinghouse for tickets, but Morris was not fully included
because of its reservation system discussed above. The Delta memo had a
chilling effect on agents who worried about losing their overrides: after the
memo, Morris Air’s travel agent bookings dropped 20 percent.126 Justice
made no determination in its probe of Delta while Morris was in existence.
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THE END OF MORRIS AIR
In October 1993, Morris Air approached Southwest Airlines proposing a
buyout. Shortly afterward, June Morris and her husband had dinner with
Herb Kelleher, Southwest’s chairman, to explore the possibility.
Negotiations began, and Southwest purchased Morris on December 14,
1993.127
June Morris cited several reasons for her decision to seek a buyout:
“…unspecified future business concerns,” a desire to reduce her schedule
after a lifetime of hard work, and a desire to spend more time with her
husband.128 David Neeleman later revealed that June Morris had started to
feel ill as well. She was diagnosed with inflammatory breast cancer at the
beginning of December, an ailment from which she eventually recovered
after a grueling battle.129
The sale was accomplished by a stock swap in which no cash changed
hands. Southwest acquired 100 percent ownership of Morris by giving its
owners 3.6 million shares of newly-issued common stock valued at a total
of $133.8 million on the last day of 1993 when the transaction took place.
Former Morris Air owners ended up controlling about 2.5 percent of the
bigger company’s stock.130 June Morris was elected to the Southwest
Board on January 20, 1994, and received options to purchase 10,000 shares
of Southwest common stock at $36.625 per share, the value of the stock at
the time.
FINANCIAL RESULTS
Their investment in Morris Air paid off handsomely for the owners of
the airline. Although Morris was never a public company, and thus did not
have to report its results, it is possible to reconstruct a picture of its
financial status through comments made by Morris officials and investors.
In 1992, Morris made a profit of $10 million, a 7 percent margin on
operating revenues of $142 million.131 By comparison, the charter service
had revenues of $82 million in 1991.132 The company projected revenues of
up to $200 million in 1993,133 but it had only achieved $116 (with a profit
of $5.3 million) by the end of the third quarter of that year.134 By then,
Morris had accumulated $50 million in long-term debt, and shareholders’
equity was $27.5 million.135 Thus the debt to equity ratio was about 2:1,
relatively low for an airline during the early 1990s.
A measure of the capital gain on the company’s share can be taken from
a statement by one of its owners, the Weston Presidio venture capital
company. Weston Presidio stated that it had invested $2 million in the
company’s initial private placement in December 1992. When its stake was
sold in 1993, Presidio made 2.5 times its money.136
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A HIDDEN AGENDA?
It would be easy to accept the public statements about the motives that
Morris had to seek a buyout by Southwest at face value. But there is
evidence that supports a different interpretation of the story of the airline:
that June Morris considered an eventual sale to Southwest from the
beginning. Morris’ integration into Southwest went exceptionally smoothly
since the two airlines were so similar. They both offered low frills, low cost,
short-haul, point-to-point service, in the same, single type of aircraft.137
Neither participated in a CRS or code sharing agreement, assigned seats, or
served meals.138 Kelleher stated, “You couldn’t put two carriers together
that are more alike than Morris Air and Southwest Airlines.”139
June Morris modeled her new airline on Southwest, and the airline’s
incorporation only followed discussions between her and Kelleher’s
management teams.140 She deliberately tailored Morris’ route system so
that it would dovetail nicely with Southwest’s141 (while the two airlines
flew to eight of the same cities, they did not compete in any city-pairs).142
June Morris would have needed to make her airline as appetizing and
easily digestible as possible. Southwest’s only previous acquisition, of
Muse Air in 1985, was a disaster.143 Southwest had lost its appetite for
acquisitions. At the time, Kelleher said, “Morris Air is a very special
situation to us. This does not signify that Southwest Airlines has caught the
acquisition mania. If Morris Air were not the special situation that it is, we
would not even have considered Morris Air.”144 In 1995, he repeated, “We
expect all of our growth to be internal. Morris Air was a very special
situation…[It] had used us as its role model.”145
Is it possible that June Morris, a very sharp lady, constructed her airline
with an eye to quickly selling it to Southwest for a lot more money than she
had put into it? The timing was perfect: Southwest was planning to expand
in the western U.S. just as she approached Kelleher.146 In a telling
statement, which gives the lie to public stories of the need to sell, Morris
spokesman Tom Kelly said, “This is not something that had to be done. If
Southwest had not had any interest, I don’t think we would have continued
[to look for a buyer].”147
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, Morris benefited significantly and throughout its
existence from being under the watchful eye of the DOT. The Department’s
notice that it would not tolerate predatory practices, backed up in Morris’
case by the investigation into Delta’s travel agent overrides, protected the
new airline from obvious attempts on the part of the majors to do away with
it.
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In terms of government action, Morris had little to complain about.
When David Neeleman testified before the National Commission to Ensure
a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, apart from discussing agency
overrides, he only wished for less taxation and less reporting
requirements.148 This latter point brought Morris once again into conflict
with the majors.
On July 1, 1993, Morris Air asked DOT to keep its traffic, capacity, and
market data (included in T-100 reports) confidential from other carriers for
a period of three years. Morris argued that as a new entrant, it faced unusual
competitive pressures from established carriers whose “mere size…makes
the identification and tracking of smaller air carriers’ fleet operations an
essential part of their competitive tools.”149 Delta and United objected to
the request, particularly its singling out new entrants for preferential
treatment, as inconsistent with the basic deregulation principle of equal
treatment for all airlines.150 Morris’ request was denied,151 rightly in our
opinion. The story of Morris Air shows what an upstart can do on a level
playing field under deregulation. Morris did not need the government to
favor it, just to let it compete.
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APPENDIX
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO
THE SUCCESS OF MORRIS AIR
ENVIRONMENT
 Many uncontested markets available
 Buyer's market in jets
 Employer's market in labor
 Federal support for start-ups
STRATEGY
 Low frequency of service
 Avoid congested airports and schedules
 Fly only short routes
 Create new air travelers
 Discipline in adhering to strategy
COST CUTTING
 Use only one kind of airframe
 Lease planes and crews
 Contract out services
 Eschew computer reservation systems
 Low seat pitch
 Leverage charter brand, experience, and investments
INNOVATION
 Ticket less travel
UNIVERSITY FLIGHT OPERATIONS
INTERNSHIPS WITH MAJOR AIRLINES:
AIRLINE PERSPECTIVES
David A. NewMyer
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Carbondale, Illinois
ABSTRACT
This study examines the partnership between U.S. airlines and aviation-oriented universities
that facilitates flight-orientated internship programs. Through the use of a literature review
and phone survey, the researchers investigate the similarities and differences between the top
twelve airlines’ internship programs. Additionally, the researchers work to dispel some of the
myths surrounding these programs and reveal the tangible and intangible benefits to the
participant, the sponsoring airline and the university.
INTRODUCTION
Major U.S. airlines and aviation-oriented universities have worked
together on flight-oriented internship programs for over fifteen years. For
example, the FedEx internship program dates back to the early 1980s.
These internship programs are advantageous to both interning university
students and the airlines. Students enjoy the educational benefits of
working in a major air carrier’s flight operations department, while earning
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college credit for their experiences on the internship. Airlines benefit from
the free or low-cost, semi-skilled workforce the internship program
provides. In addition, airlines have the opportunity to “get an early look” at
some of college aviation’s top students and future flight officer candidates.
In 1988, United Airlines issued an unpublished internal report that
discusses their reasons for developing and maintaining internship
agreements with university aviation flight programs (Spencer, 1988).
These reasons are as follows:
1. Develop additional resources for high quality flight officer
candidates;
2. Improve the supply of qualified flight officer candidates;
3. Increase the number of qualified minority and female flight officer
candidates; and
4. Take advantage of the college and university system as a resource for
the pilot of the future.
As flight operations internships were integrated into the major airlines,
they became a more significant opportunity for university students seeking
employment as airline pilots. However, no one has cataloged major airline
flight operations internship programs in an attempt to present their size,
scope, benefits, limitations and intent.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to present the results of a telephone survey
conducted in August and September 1997 targeting the top twelve major
U.S. airlines based on gross annual revenue as reported by the Air
Transportation Association’s 1997 Annual Report. The goal of the survey
was to gauge the size, scope, benefits, limitations and intent of the flight
operations internship programs at these airlines. In the course of collecting
survey data, a variety of issues related to airline flight operations
internships were identified. As a framework for examining these data, four
common student perceptions associated with airline flight operations
internships were discussed from the perspective of the data collected from
the airlines:
1. Interns are actively involved in aircraft operations;
2. Interns are paid a salary;
3. All airlines offer interns travel passes; and
4. All airlines interns are guaranteed a post internship pilot interview.
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Definitions
Before proceeding with this research, it was important to define the
terms “internship” and “cooperative education”, especially as they relate to
aviation.
In general terms, academic or experiential internships are project-
oriented experiences that can be taken for academic credit. Internships
involve spending a pre-arranged period of time working in a field of study
or interest.
The 1998 Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC)
Undergraduate Catalog defines an aviation occupational internship as
“…an unpaid internship position…performing duties and services in an
instructional setting as previously arranged with the sponsoring work-site
supervisor” (p. 159).
A flight operations internship adheres to the basic principles associated
with other internship programs, with emphasis on airline flight operations.
For example, the Northwest Airlines-SIUC Internship agreement reads,
“The purpose of this agreement is to establish an Internship Program by
which students at SIUC will be given an opportunity to enhance their
education through work assignments at Northwest” (Mallory, 1997, p. 1).
The National Commission for Cooperative Education (1999) describes
cooperative education this way.
Cooperative education is a structured educational strategy integrating
classroom studies with learning through productive work experiences in a
field related to a student’s academic or career goals. It provides progressive
experiences in integrating theory and practice. Co-op is a partnership among
students, educational institutions and employers, with specified
responsibilities for each party. (p. 1)
The primary difference between an internship and a co-op is that
internships are usually unpaid work experiences, while co-ops are salaried.
Also, co-ops typically require that the student alternate between multiple
periods of pre-arranged work assignments and semesters of traditional on-
campus academic learning.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is limited material in aviation-related refereed journals that
address the subject of university-airline flight operations internships. Non-
refereed sources, including aviation-specific magazines, periodicals and
industry publications, do contain general information related to aviation
internships. These sources discuss such areas as aviation maintenance and
management and may have some application to airline flight operations
internships.
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The University Aviation Association (UAA) reports that “the civil pilot
training (CPT) program of World War II served as a foundation for
partnerships between colleges and the aviation industry” (Kiteley, 1997).
Kiteley goes on to say that internships and co-ops are just one form of
partnership between universities/colleges and airlines. Other types of
university and college partnerships with the airlines can include internships
for faculty, service on advisory committees, and using airlines as sources of
guest lecturers/adjunct faculty (Kiteley, 1997).
An article on a potential pilot shortage explains the need or rationale for
aviation internships in general. [O]ne of the keys for bridging the
experience gap among young pilots is to develop closer cooperation
between industry and schools, including establishing internship and
work/educational cooperatives (Bradley, 1997, p. 80).
With regard to aviation-related internships and co-ops, a University
Aviation Association (UAA) sponsored study (Schukert, 1993) reported
that 31 UAA member institutions participated in over 60 aviation-related
cooperative educational programs within their non-engineering aviation
degree programs. According to Schukert, the federal government serves
more aviation-related co-op students than any other agency/organization.
The role of aviation-related co-ops and internships has been addressed
by several authors.
The success and popularity of co-op is largely attributable to the fact that all
three players benefit. In addition to increasing graduate placement, schools
become privy to the public and private sector needs that their curricula should
address. Employers gain access to committed, knowledgeable, temporary, and
low-cost help, plus an opportunity to groom full-time employees. The
participating students get a unique opportunity to experience the real world in
their chosen profession. Co-op programs usually provide pay and/or academic
credit, and students gain a “foot in the door” with a familiar post-graduate
employment prospect. (Kiteley, 1997, p. 1).
Another view is presented by Turney (1997).
More specifically, aviation employers can look forward to the following
benefits of starting an intern program: Highly motivated and enthusiastic
employees; short term commitment; meeting immediate staffing needs;
providing a diverse population; freeing professional staff; and facilitating
entry-level recruitment (p. 2).
An article in the November 1996 issue of Flight Training notes an
important rationale for an aviation internship from a student’s perspective.
Simply stated, an internship or cooperative education program (co-op) is an
opportunity for a college student to combine traditional on-campus academic
learning with professional work experience in a chosen field. These programs
allow students in a large number of collegiate aviation programs to bridge the
gap between the classroom and the real world. (Phillips, 1996, p. 44)
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This article also discusses airline internships at United, Delta, TWA,
USAir, and FedEx. The author mentions numerous benefits associated with
these internships, including being hired for full time jobs at United and
FedEx, potential for being hired at Delta, free simulator time, some travel
benefits, and jump seat flights for interns (Phillips, 1996).
With regard to airline internships specifically, an article in the October
1991 Collegiate Aviation Review reported that three airlines (United,
Northwest and Eastern) had a total of six university or community college
“partners” including three airline-university intern agreements (NewMyer,
1991). It was noted that these partnerships were a response to the airline
industry’s need for qualified, quality pilots. This article also noted that as a
result of an internship connection between United Airlines and Southern
Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC) nineteen former interns from
SIUC had been hired by United as flight officers as of the fourth year of the
United-SIUC agreement. The article mentioned that, “United Airlines
doesn’t use this agreement as a primary source of pilots. Rather, it is a
supplement to its regular flight officer employment process” (NewMyer,
1991, p. 16).
One of the strongest statements in support of airline internships, which
also provides an interesting corporate philosophy, is the opening statement
from the Southwest Airlines Internship Program Guidelines.
Southwest Airlines recognizes the importance and benefits of an official,
company-wide internship program. By having young, talented and educated
people from the aviation community come work for us, Southwest will be
more efficient and productive than ever. In return, the interns will gain hands-
on experience in the day-to-day operations of an airline. (Self, 1996)
In general, the available literature points to the benefits of aviation and
airline internships to both the airline and the student. The literature also
contains some descriptive material that discusses airline flight operations
internships and mentions that such programs exist at five major airlines.
However, the reviewed literature contained no industry-wide
comprehensive information about flight operations internships at all major
airlines.
METHODOLOGY
This study investigates the size, scope, benefits, limitations and intent of
the flight operations internship programs at twelve major U.S. airlines
(based on gross annual revenue as reported by the Air Transportation
Association’s 1997 Annual Report). (See Table 1).
This was accomplished by contacting internship coordinators
representing the twelve major U.S. airlines and surveying them by
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telephone. The instrument was qualitative in design. Each question
contained either a structured response list or elicited an open-ended
response. Kaufman and English (1979) suggested that a prepared list of
items may erode creativity, however, a prepared list does provide
comprehensive data when validated by expert opinion.
The researchers developed the survey instrument with the assistance of a
focus group composed of aviation management and flight department
faculty members. The focus group discussed the objectives of the study,
and consensus was eventually gained on questionnaire design and
composition. The effort to use a focus group is supported in the literature.
“By conducting one or more focus groups before initiating a survey, both
sponsors and researchers can sometimes get a better grasp of the problem
and formulate the research questions more accurately” (Alreck & Settle,
1997, p. 393). Another view, presented by Morgan (1997), is that “focus
groups…can be used to generate survey questionnaires or to develop the
content of applied programs and interventions” (p. 3).
The survey instrument used in this study is composed of ten question
areas, as listed below. (See Appendix A .)
1. How many students does your airline intern per semester?
2. How many colleges/universities does your airline work with?
3. Are interns paid a salary? If so, how much are they paid?
4. Does your airline offer benefits other than a salary?
5. Does your airline offer post internship benefits?
6. What locations/stations are interns assigned to?
7. What departments are interns assigned to?
8. What qualifications/qualities does your airline desire in an intern?
9. What is the most important learning experience your airline
provides the intern?
10. What do you believe the internship program brings/contributes to
your airline?
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Table 1. Top Twelve Major U.S. Airlines, Based on Gross Annual Revenues, 1997
Alaska American America West Continental
Delta FedEx Northwest Southwest
TWA United UPS US Air
Source: Air Transportation Association, 1997
A telephone contact list of the twelve survey airline’s flight operations
internship coordinators was developed. In most instances, the contact
person was known. In those instances where the contact person was not
known, inquiries were made to the flight operations departments of those
airlines.
Telephone calls were made over a period of three weeks in August and
September of 1997. Airline internship coordinators were asked to react to
survey questions and to expand upon their response to the extent necessary.
For example, the majority of participants answered in great depth to survey
question 10: “What do you believe the internship program
brings/contributes to your airline?” In contrast, research questions 4, 5, 7
and 8 required “yes” or “no” responses to predetermined sub-components
of a question. For example, the question: “Does your airline offer benefits
other than a salary?” Sub-components to that question included jump seat
privileges, travel passes, simulator use, etc.
A telephone survey was selected as the most appropriate method of data
collection for this study. Carstenson, Sluti and Luedtke (1996) note:
…several advantages of gathering data by telephone are: one can contact a
widely dispersed group of individuals or sites; no field staff are required, as
may be necessary when conducting personal interviews; this method has a
relatively low-cost per contact; also, that interviewer bias is more controllable;
it is a rapid means of collecting data; and the response rate is much higher than
mail surveys. (p. 5)
Follow-up calls were made to confirm the data received and to assure a
commonality of response made for each question. To increase validity, a
new researcher was utilized to conduct follow-up telephone interviews.
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Table 2. Number of Interns per Semester at Twelve Major U.S. Airlines, 1997
Alaska 2-7
America West 3-4
American 22
Continental 10-16
Delta 3-12
FedEx 5-8
Northwest 20-30
Southwest 3
TWA 30
United 30-40
UPS 2
USAir 5-7
RESULTS
The response to question 1, which asked “How many students does your
airline intern per semester?”, is important to reveal the scope of flight
operations intern programs (see Table 2). Four airlines (American,
Northwest, TWA and United) serve 20 or more students per semester in
flight operations internships. The remaining eight airlines (Alaska,
America West, Continental, Delta, Fed Ex, Southwest, UPS and US
Airways) serve less than 16 students per semester. Overall, the twelve
airlines, as a group, serve 135 to 181 students per semester, or an average of
11.3 to 15.1 students per semester per airline.
Another important scope/size determinant was question 2, “How many
colleges/universities does your airline work with?” A total of 103 colleges
and universities maintain internship agreements with the airlines surveyed.
University-airline partnerships ranged from 1 to 22, with an average of 8.7
for all twelve airlines. Four airlines (American, Northwest, TWA and
United) work with 15 or more universities (see Figure 1). The remaining
eight airlines work with 7, or fewer, universities. Some of the universities
most frequently mentioned were Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
(both Daytona Beach and Prescott campuses), Louisiana Tech University,
Southern Illinois University Carbondale and the University of North
Dakota.
In an effort to ascertain the compensation component of the airline
internships offered, question 3 asked if the internships were paid (by salary
or wage), and if so, how much per month. Only two of the twelve major
airlines surveyed offered paid internships, salaries range from $1,500 to
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Figure 1. Number of university and/or college partner by airline, 1997.
$2,000 per month (since the completion of this survey, a third airline now
pays its flight operations interns).
Since only two airlines pay their interns, it was important to discover
what other benefits the airlines offer their interns. Question 4, addressed
benefits other than pay options. A key benefit offered at ten of the airlines
surveyed are “jump seat” or “observer member of crew” (OMC) privileges.
This benefit allows an intern to occupy an observation seat located in the
rear of aircraft flight deck during a regularly scheduled flight. This is a
tremendous educational experience for the student as they are allowed the
opportunity to observe a flight crew “in action”, as well as obtain a first
hand view of airline operations. Several of the airlines surveyed limit this
privilege to a certain number of flights during the internship period, or as
specified by the intern’s supervisor.
Another benefit provided by several airlines is the travel pass. Seven of
the twelve airlines surveyed offer this benefit (see Figure 2). The airlines
allow interns a limited number of passes that are valid for various periods of
time and cost to the student. Travel passes are limited to domestic U.S.
destinations, with one exception; U.S. Airways also allows international
travel (see Appendix B).
Another key educational benefit to flight operations interns is the use of
full motion simulators during their internships. Ten of the twelve airlines
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Figure 2. Benefits other than pay offered by airline internship programs
at twelve major U.S. airlines, 1997.
offer this benefit. Several airlines encourage simulator use by flight
operations interns. Interns at those airlines can receive as much as 50 to 100
hours of simulator “flight time” in one semester in a variety of aircraft
including, the MD-80, DC10, B-737 and B-747.
In contrast, Flight Engineer training is only offered by one airline as an
internship benefit. This is possibly due to the scarcity of three-person crew
training at some airlines and the cost of such a benefit at most airlines.
Finally, all airlines offer tours of major airline facilities as a key benefit
of the flight operations internship. Tours of the maintenance facilities are
offered by ten of the twelve airlines. Tours of major airline facilities expose
students to the complexity and scope of airline operations. Aircraft
manufacturing plant tours are also provided by seven of the twelve airlines.
Aircraft manufacturing plant tours not only allow interns the opportunity to
view the intricacies of the aircraft manufacturing process, but also expose
the intern to procedures involved in delivering aircraft for airline service.
Another educational benefit that airline flight operations internships
provide is the opportunity for the student to experience learning in an
industry setting. Three of the airlines surveyed offer seven or more intern
assignment locations, three offer two locations and the other six airlines
offer only one location. Among all twelve airlines, a total of 27 separate
geographic locations are offered coast to coast (see Appendix C).
Intern duty assignments can vary widely by airline (see Figure 3). Two
airlines, America West and Fed Ex, focus their internship effort in airline
dispatch or ground-based, flight coordination support functions. These two
airlines do not assign interns to their flight training academies or domicile
chief pilot offices. Ten of the twelve major airlines do offer internships at
their flight academies, while only six of the twelve offer them at domicile
chief pilot offices around the nation. A key benefit of being in a flight
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Figure 3. Intern duty assignments offered at twelve major U.S. airlines, 1997.
training academy for an internship is that the assigned intern gains an
understanding of the process used to train an airline pilot, including the
professional expectations demanded of a person in that profession. An
additional benefit is that the student gains access to flight training
personnel, flight simulators, flight training devices, human factors training
and other airline-oriented training experiences. These experiences can be
invaluable in a student’s career. Seven of the twelve airlines surveyed offer
flight operations internship assignments at airline headquarter locations
and airline flight safety offices. Finally, two airlines offer flight operations
internships in the pilot recruitment area of the airline.
Post internship benefits are also offered by some airlines. Travel pass
privileges are offered to students by six of the twelve airlines after
successful completion of the internship. The possibility of earning a flight
engineer certificate during the course of an internship is offered by only one
airline. A key benefit to some students is a guaranteed interview for a pilot
position. This benefit is offered by five of the twelve airlines. However,
several airlines mentioned that while they do not guarantee an interview,
good work during the internship will very likely get the student a letter of
reference from the airline, which will help when the student applies later
for pilot employment. Of those offering guaranteed interviews, four limit
an intern to either one or two interviews. One airline reported that over 200
former interns have been hired as pilots at that airline alone.
Another aspect of the airline flight operations internship programs is the
qualifications that the airlines are looking for when they select their interns
(see Figure 4). In the area of flight qualifications, five airlines require the
Federal Aviation Administration Commercial Pilot Certificate with the
Instrument Rating. Two of these five airlines also require the multi-engine
rating. None of the 12 airlines surveyed required a flight instructor’s
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Figure 4. Intern qualifications for twelve major U.S. airlines, 1997.
certificate. In one case, an airline required only a Private Pilot Certificate,
with all other certificates and ratings listed as “preferred”. Another listed
the Private Pilot Certificate as “desirable”. Others indicated advanced
ratings as “nice to see”. Several airlines stated that eligibility requirements
were based on decisions made by the universities during their on-campus
screening process.
With regard to the grade point average (GPA) of intern candidates, five
airlines reported a 3.0 (on a 4.0 scale) intern selection minimum, while one
reported a 2.5 minimum GPA. The other six either had no requirement, had
a “preferred” GPA, or considered GPA as one of several selection factors
but with no specific identified level. Finally, in terms of flight hours, two
airlines reported that they wanted their interns to have 200 or more flight
hours of experience. The other airlines had no hour requirement, but a few
looked at this as a selection criterion combined with several other factors
but at no specified hour amount.
At the conclusion of the telephone survey, airline flight operations
internship coordinators were asked two questions to elicit opinions about
the value of the airline flight intern programs:
1. “What do you believe is the most important learning experience your
airline provides the interns?”
2. “What do you believe the internship program brings/contributes to
your airline?”
These were the open-ended questions, which resulted in a wide variety
of responses. However, central themes did emerge when all of the airline’s
answers were tabulated as a group.
In terms of what the airlines provide to the interns, six airlines
mentioned that the interns get a “total company perspective” or “what an
airline really is and really does.” That is, the interns are exposed to the
“amount of detail, the amount of regulation” involved in keeping an airline
operating on a daily basis. Three airlines mentioned the importance of the
internship in preparing university students for a position in the airline
industry. As one airline put it, it provides “exposure to what they might be
doing later on.” Finally, another three airlines mentioned “the specific
involvement with an airline flight operations environment,” or “real hands-
on experience” in airline flight operations as the key advantage given to the
interns.
As far as the value of the internship to the airline, it was interesting that
seven of the twelve airlines mentioned “enthusiasm” as one of the things
that interns bring to the airline. Several airlines put it this way: They bring
enthusiasm!” “A shot of energy!” “Enthusiasm and hard work—it’s a trade
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off, we (the airline) get some hard work and fresh ideas in exchange for
what we give to the interns. Another airline mentioned that in addition to
enthusiasm, interns are a ”morale booster" to regular airline employees.
Three airlines mentioned that interns “take the load off” of regular
employees. That is, interns frequently work on projects that regular
employees simply do not have time for. One airline commented on the
specialized skills students bring to an internship, “Interns bring skills that
not only reflect computer literacy, but aviation literacy as well. That
combination simply is not available from any other source.”
Finally, a contribution mentioned by two airlines was the connection
between the intern program and future employment at the airline. As one
airline put it, “the internship program helps us identify and, hopefully,
select good, solid employees and pilots.” Another stated: “This is an
opportunity to screen possible future employees. This gives us a base to
choose from since we generally hire from within.”
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the size, scope and benefits of the airline flight
internships at the top twelve major U.S. airlines are as follows.
1. These programs serve 2 to 40 interns per semester per airline, or
overall, 135 to 181 students per semester (all airlines).
2. The 12 airlines work with a total of 103 colleges and universities, with
partnerships ranging from 1 university per airline to 22 universities
per airline.
3. Two of 12 airlines pay their flight operations interns (although a third
airline added pay after this survey was completed).
4. A majority of airlines reported offering the following benefits other
than pay: Airline headquarters tours; Jump seat privileges; Simulator
training; Airline maintenance facility tours; and Airline travel passes.
5. A total of 29 separate geographic locations for flight operations
internships were reported by the 12 airlines, with 6 of the airlines
offering more than 1 location.
6. A total of 6 of 12 airlines offered post-internship travel pass
privileges.
7. Five of 12 airlines offered guaranteed pilot employment interviews to
those students successfully completing flight operations internships.
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This study has also served to dispel four student misconceptions
typically associated with airline flight operations internships.
1. “Interns are actively involved in aircraft operations.”
This is certainly not the case. Interns are assigned to a variety of support
positions, but are only allowed on the flight deck in an “observer member of
crew” capacity.
2. “Interns are paid a salary.”
Two of the 12 airlines surveyed pay interns a salary according to survey
results, with a third airline adding pay in 1999. However, all the airlines
surveyed offer some type of non-salary benefit(s) to interns.
3. “All airlines offer interns travel passes.”
Seven of the 12 airlines surveyed offer interns travel passes. Conditions
and limitations are associated with the dispensing and validity of these
privileges.
4. “All airline interns are guaranteed a post internship pilot
interview.”
Five of the 12 airlines surveyed provide guaranteed pilot interviews as a
post internship benefit. Several of airlines that do not offer this benefit
mentioned that, while not guaranteed, it is likely an intern will receive a
letter of recommendation for employment with the airline.
Flight operations internship programs provide a broad range of learning
opportunities and professional growth experiences for the interns. As we
have illustrated throughout this study, the nature and variety of learning
experiences to which the intern is exposed vary among the airlines. Travel
benefits, guaranteed pilot interviews, jump seat privileges and other
internship benefits also vary among airlines. However, all airline internship
programs mentioned in this article do share one common objective—
contributing to the professional growth of the student and subsequently
securing the future of the aviation industry.
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APPENDIX A
Characteristics of Flight Operations
Intern Programs at Major US Airlines
Name and position of airline representative being interviewed:
1. How many students does your airline intern per semester?________
2. How many colleges/universities does your airline work
with?___________
3. Is the internship paid? Yes No
If paid, how much?_________________
4. Benefits—other than pay:
Jump seat privileges Yes No
Travel pass privileges Yes No
If so, how many?________________
Restrictions/limitations?
Simulator use Yes No
Flight Engineer Certificate Yes No
World headquarters tour Yes No
Maintenance facility tour Yes No
Manufacturing plant tour Yes No
Other benefits, specify:
5. Intern assignment locations, i.e., Chicago, Dallas/Fort Worth,
Atlanta, etc.
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6. Intern duty assignments:
Flight Training Center/Academy Yes No
Domicile Chief Pilot Offices Yes No
Airline Headquarters Yes No
Flight Safety Offices Yes No
Other, specify:
7. Post Internship Benefits:
Pass Privileges Yes No
Flight Engineer Certificate Yes No
Guaranteed Pilot Interview Yes No
Limit on number of interviews Yes No
If so, how many allowed?
8. Desired intern qualifications
Class rank: sophomore junior senior
Certificates/Ratings:
Commercial Yes No
Instrument Yes No
Multi-engine Yes No
CFI (A) Yes No
CFI (I) Yes No
GPA:
Flight hours:
Other, specify
9. What do you believe is the most important learning experience your
airline provides the intern?
10. What do you believe the internship program brings/contributes to
your airline?
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APPENDIX B
Travel Pass Privileges
United:
One 95% discount on ticket for each 30 days worked, for intern and
spouse (round trip).
American:
One round trip for each month worked up to 90 days & some service
fees—transferable to parents/spouse—limited access.
Delta:
No privileges.
Continental:
Four non-revenue round trips—useable up to six months after the
internship.
TWA:
One travel pass with minimum of two weeks service, space available—
useable up to six months after internship.
Southwest:
Offer privileges, but no listing of requirements.
Northwest:
One round-trip pass for every 30 days worked—no overseas.
USAirways:
For each 40 hours worked—one domestic travel pass or international
travel pass for 80 hours worked.
American West:
No privileges.
Alaska:
No privileges.
UPS:
No privileges.
FedEx:
No privileges.
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APPENDIX C
Internship Locations
Boston:
American
Honolulu, Hawaii:
United
Anchorage, Alaska:
United
Los Angeles:
American
Delta
United
San Francisco:
United
Portland:
Delta
Seattle:
United
Salt Lake City:
Delta
Minneapolis:
Northwest
Chicago:
American
United
St. Louis:
TWA
Denver:
United
Dallas:
American
Miami:
American
United
Orlando:
Delta
Atlanta:
Delta
Louisville:
UPS
Cincinaatti:
Delta Washington, DC:
American
United
New York:
Delta
TWA
United
BOOK REVIEW
GUDMUNDSSON, S. V. (1998). Flying Too Close To The Sun: The Success
and Failure of the New-Entrant Airlines. Aldershot, Hants/Brookfield,
Vermont: Ashgate. Pp. xvi + 259. ISBN 1-84014-366-5. Price $79.95, hard
cover.
REVIEWED BY THOMAS C. LAWTON, Royal Holloway University of London
Set in the wake of the 1979 deregulation of U.S. air transport, Flying Too
Close To The Sun endeavours to explain the complex issues that led to the
almost total failure rate of the first-wave new entrant airlines. This is an
interesting and highly relevant topic and the book succeeds in providing an
objective and impartial analysis of a period in U.S. aviation history that
evokes considerable passion among those directly involved. It is strong on
empirical data that charts the emergence and subsequent decline of new
entrant U.S. airlines during the 1980s. This is one of the few books to address
this important subject. Also, in considering corporate strategy and market
competition, Gudmundsson moves beyond the narrow cost or operational
focus of many such works.
Sveinn Gudmundsson has significant knowledge of the industry as an
academic researcher based both in the U.S. and Europe. He is Assistant
Professor in the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at the
University of Maastricht, the Netherlands. He was previously Principal
Lecturer in Transport at London Guildhall University. Dr Gudmundsson
gained his Ph.D. in Air Transport Management from Cranfield University in
the UK and has also studied at the School of Aeronautics and the School of
Management at Florida Institute of Technology in the U.S.
The book is structured in two parts. Part one examines the theory, strategy
and policy behind the success and failure of U.S. new entrant airlines. The
four chapters in this section look at the nature and development of U.S. new
entrant airlines and consider the market and industry environment in which
they operate. Part Two assesses the success and failure of new entrant
airlines. The five chapters advance evidence that explains how and why most
new entrants fail(ed) to attain and sustain competitive advantage.
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Turning to a chapter-by-chapter critique, Chapter 2 considers the
operating environment and tackles an important misconception among
airline analysts and practitioners: that economies of scale do not exist in the
industry, making it easier for new entrants to emerge. This may be the case
but as Gudmundsson argues, incumbents have erected other, equally
effective entry barriers. Moreover, the industry’s structure and
market/political environment contrive to create infrastructure barriers that
have adversely effected the survival prospects of many new entrants.
The chapter proceeds to develop a list of these barriers that can
disproportionately hurt new entrants relative to incumbents. These include
code-sharing, computer reservation systems (biased in favour of the
owners), volume incentives to travel agents, access to landing slots at
congested airports and restricted access to airport facilities. Significant
empirical evidence is provided to sustain these arguments. However, some
confusion seems to exist as to what constitutes a genuine entry barrier to new
entrant airlines and what factors are simply competitive challenges to all
airlines. For instance, quality of service, restriction of airport expansion and
environmental impact restrictions are all cited as entry barriers to new
entrant airlines. It is not clear why such factors would disproportionately
affect new entrants. It may be argued that they are simply challenges that
affect all competitors in the industry. Overall, this is a very readable and
informative chapter.
Chapter 3, The Anatomy of a New Entrant, provides an interesting and
insightful look behind the scenes of the new entrant airlines. In considering
the people and personalities behind the companies, Gudmundsson argues
that charismatic and autocratic leaders can be important in launching an
airline (but may become a liability as the airline increases in size). Evidence
is also provided to illustrate that most airline start-ups are led by people with
considerable prior experience of the airline industry. A further important
element of new entrants human dimension is the employee-company
relationship. In order to deter unionisation, maintain low salary levels and
encourage higher efficiency levels, most new entrant airlines operate profit-
sharing and stock ownership programmes. As the author points out, this
system can prove very effective when times are good but can be extremely
disruptive during lean/low profit periods.
Chapter 3 also considers the finance and profitability of new entrants. It
concludes that one of the problems besetting many such airlines is their
inability to turn a profit in their early years. This makes them vulnerable to
adverse conditions in the economy and low periods in market demand.
Gudmundsson further argues that the advantage accrued to new entrants
through lower cost structures is offset by incumbent yield management
systems, which facilitate price cuts. This is a tenuous assumption, as
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sophisticated yield management systems operated by established airlines
can be negated or even trumped by efficient load factor management on the
part of new entrant airlines. Granted, managing load factors is not enough to
ensure profitability. The issue is rather one of relating the average load factor
to the break-even load factor. Improving this equation is the objective of
every airline and could prove a better system than yield management for new
entrant airlines. Sveinn Gudmundsson appears preoccupied with yield
management systems (see also Chapter 2 and entry barriers). However,
lessons from European new entrants such as Ryanair and easyJet illustrate
that the yield management approach need not be of relevance to U.S. new
entrant airlines.
Chapter 4 on Competition Strategy is largely derived from economics,
hence offering a framework in line with authors such as Michael Porter.
Some relevant non-economics-based literature such as Henry Mintzberg’s
conceptualisation of strategic positioning is noticeable by its absence.
Despite this omission, this chapter provides a lively and accurate analysis of
the competitive dynamics and strategic options that surround an airline
attempting to establish market presence.
In the fifth chapter, Gudmundsson considers the question of success or
failure. This is an interesting and reflective chapter that traces the various
factors contributing to the market success or failure of a company. As you
might imagine, the list of variables includes financial, marketing,
management, organisational, operations, strategy and environment
determinants. These are then individually broken down to examine the sub-
categories of causes. An interesting point raised here is that success can lead
to failure. By this the author means the cause of a specific predicament is the
inertia caused by the positive strokes of success, leading to resistance to
change.
In brief, the main arguments advanced in this chapter are first, there is a
correlation between a firm’s novelty and likelihood of bankruptcy; second,
there also appears to be a relationship between macroeconomic variables
such as interest rate, deregulation of industries, recession and increased
competition intensity, with failure; and third, management appears to be the
main contributor to the failure of firms. I think that this just about covers all
relevant factors.
Chapter 6 lays out the empirical findings of Gudmundsson’s research
and Chapter 7 develops the notion of failure or distress prediction models.
These are weaker chapters, relative to what came before and add little value
to the overall analysis and argument. Chapters 6 to 8 (inclusive) are shaped
exclusively by economic theory and characterised by the crunching of
considerable data. This is done in a methodical and efficient manner.
However, it is not always accessible to the reader lacking in econometrics
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training. Much of this section is densely written and difficult for the non-
economist to read and digest.
In the conclusions controlled growth is identified as an important
ingredient for the non-failure of new entrants. As the author correctly points
out, very fast growth places great demand on an airline’s resources that
eventually leads to inefficiencies plus strategic alterations that cause serious
adjustment problems for the airline.
It is further argued that whilst comparatively low fares are important
(especially during entry), these must be backed by a comparatively high
service quality if advantage is to be sustained. This is an accurate and very
important point. As Gudmundsson indicates, service quality does not mean
service features such as frequent flyer programmes or free inflight meals. It
simply means ensuring that the customer is satisfied with the basic product
provided.
The book’s final conclusion is that no prescription exists for success or
the avoidance of failure due to the dynamism of the airlines’ interaction with
its environment. Nonetheless, Gudmundsson does advance six critical
factors that new entrant airlines should be aware of. These include high
relevant quality, high relative aircraft utilisation, controlled growth and
resourceful innovation. This is sound advice.
Flying Too Close To The Sun should prove of interest to many JATWW
readers and contains much that is both stimulating and original.
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